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America's press have a societal purpose to inform the
public so that the people can assert meaningful control over
the governing process. However, media coverage of the recent
health care debate suggests that the press is not fulfilling
their democratic responsibility.
The introduction reviews several approaches to media
studies, and outlines a method for studying the media's
effect on the debate over President Clinton's health care
reform proposal. Anti-government themes and anti-reform
propaganda exacerbated a media feeding frenzy. Eventually,
pack journalism engulfed President Clinton's proposal. The
media focused on the surface aspects of the political debate,
contributing little to the public's understanding of policy
matters.
The case study illustrates the mass media's significant
control and influence over the flow of information truncated
the debate. The limited scope of media coverage often
focused on the negative aspects of the President's proposal
or the thrust and parry of politics, not in-depth analysis.
Thus, media coverage often lacked context, reinforced
conventional wisdom, and ultimately failed to help the public
understand and decide on an important policy issue.
Considering that the public has demanded health care reform
for the past two decades, the effect of the media's feeding
frenzy was anti-democratic because it contributed not only to
the defeat of President Clinton's health care proposal, but
to any solution. The media treated the public as spectators,
not as members of a society engaged in a difficult policy
decision.

11

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT..................................................... il
Chapter
1. Introduction:
The Media, Democracy, and
Health Care Reform....................................

1

Conceptualizing the Media's
Influence on Democracy............................

5

The Clinton Plan..................................

14

The Media's Historic Failure........................ 20
2. Health Care is Un-American:
Anti-Government Sentiment and the Liberal Myth........ 22
3. Mountain of Misinformation:
The Media and Anti-Refrom Flak......................... 43
4. No Exit:
A Chart, A Scandal, and a Bus Tour..................... 65
5. Conclusion: The Anti-Democratic Effects of
America's Media.........................................87
The Liberal Myth..................................

92

Anti-Reform Flak..................................

95

Feeding Frenzy....................................

99

Bibliography................................................ 106

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION:
THE MEDIA, DEMOCRACY, AND HEALTH CARE REFORM

To claim that America's media have an anti-democratic
effect on domestic policymaking is to contradict the
traditional belief that the press are "cantankerous,
obstinate, and ubiquitous in their search for truth and their
independence of authority."i

Today, however, this standard

conception is frequently challenged by even mainstream
political commentators.

For example, Charles E. Lindblom and

Edward J. Woodhouse suggest that the media's attempts to be
objective are more likely to reinforce "conventional
interpretations of current events."2

By reinforcing

conventional wisdom the media narrow the "competition of
ideas," and fracture the "foundation of democracy —

the

capacity of the citizen to analyze his or her own needs and
to find policies for meeting them."3

“I Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing
Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1988), 298.
2 Charles E. Lindblom and Edward J. Woodhouse, The
Policy Making Process 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. :
Prentice Hall Inc., 1993), 117.
3 Ibid., 124.
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However, the idea that the press simply narrow the
competition of ideas is somewhat inadequate, given the
importance of the media to deliberative democratic processes.
As Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky contend, America's media
actually have a societal purpose, that is itself valuable.

A

democratic press can empower people "to assert meaningful
control over the political process by providing them with the
information needed for the intelligent discharge of political
responsibilities."4
From Herman and Chomsky's viewpoint, the media's
tendency to reinforce conventional wisdom and to focus on the
surface aspects of political debate does more than just
fracture a citizen's ability to choose "goods" from Lindblom
and Woodhouse's supermarket of ideas.

Instead, the media

fosters a climate of conformity which can impede the public's
ability to play an informed role in the policy-making
process.

Therefore, shallow media coverage actually

truncates democratic debate.
Unlike the press's more manifest functions —
providing information —

such as

curtailing political discourse is a

latent function of America's market-based news media.

It is

these functions Herman and Chomsky are referring to when they
contend that the media support the status quo and hinder the
public's ability to "assert meaningful control over the
political

p r o c e s s . "5

The following chapters suggest that even

^ Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent. 298.
5 Ibid.
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though the media obstruct the practice of democracy, the
result is not just a reaffirmation of the status quo.
Instead, the media can fortify a democracy without citizens,
which Benjamin Barber refers to as democracy's thin veneer:
[yielding] neither the pleasures of participation
nor the fellowship of civic association, neither
the autonomy and self-governance of continuous
political activity nor the enlarging mutuality of
shared public goods ... [it] is at best a politics
of static interest, never a politics of
transformation; a politics of bargaining and
exchange, never a politics of invention and
creation.... 6
There are many theoretical constructs which attempt to
describe how America's media curtail democratic deliberation.
Yet, none of these are universally applicable.

In order to

shed further light on the media's anti-democratic effect,
this thesis investigates the press's role in defeating the
Clinton administration's health care initiative, and contends
that their substantial influence over the flow of raw
information, and their interpretations of that information,
truncated the health care debate, and had an anti-democratic
effect.
In pursuit of these goals, a three part overview is
outlined in the remainder of this chapter.

The initial

section sketches out a conceptual approach specific to the
media's effect on the health care debate.

The second section

establishes how the Clinton Administration formed the Health

^ Benjemiin Barber, Strong Danocracv; Participatory
Politics for a New Age (Berkeley, Ca: University of
California Press, 1984), 24-25.
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Care Security Act of 1993.

The final section describes the

in-depth evaluation to be taken up in the following chapters.
Before preceding, however, it is important to make a
point of clarification.

This analysis draws a distinction

between the "mass media" and the "media."

The latter refers

to the news media, the press or journalists.
media" is much broader.

The term "mass

It refers to not only the media, but

also other forms of news, marketing and entertainment
delivered to the public via electronic and print mediums —
such as information delivered through television, radio,
films, newspapers, magazines, journals, and books.?
Part of the problem with media studies is that the
barrier between the news media and other elements of the mass
media have become increasingly blurred.

For instance, is

Rush Limbaugh providing people with news or is his radio
program entertainment?

One could also question whether ABC's

"Prime Time Live" is a news or an entertainment program.

Is

Sam Donaldson a journalist, an entertainer or a political
commentator?

The fact that these distinctions increasingly

lack distinction is important because news coverage is
packaged —
events.

by the reporter's tone and interpretations of

If information is being framed for entertainment

value instead of information value, it can alter the message
conveyed.

^ Leo F. Jefferies, Mass Media Processes 2nd ed.
(Prospect Heights, II: Westland Press, Inc., 1994), 3

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Conceptualizing the Media's Influence on Democracy
A common problem when studying news coverage is that
empirical proof of the media's influence on society can be
inconclusive.

However, one may nonetheless theoretically

conceptualize and interpret the media's effect on
participatory democracy.

One way to do this is to begin with

the premise that internal and external factors influence
press coverage, which shapes raw information contributing to
media content, i.e., content influence studies.

The media's

messages are dependent variables determined by influential
factors which are the independent

variables.8

There are also process and effect studies.

As the

terminology suggests, these studies are concerned with how
media content affects society.

For instance, a common

research question is whether news coverage of violence causes
children to be more aggressive.

In such studies, media

content is considered to be the independent variable.8

This

analysis investigates the press's influence on the health
care debate; thus it is primarily a content effects study.
However, it is necessary to determine and organize what
factors influenced media content during the debate prior to
contending that it had an anti-democratic effect because some
factors were more relevant than others.
^ Pamela J. Shoemaker and Stephen D. Reese. Mediating
the Message: Theories of influences on Mass Media Content.
2nd ed. (White Plains, NY: Longman Publishers USA, 1996), 4,
11 .
9 Ibid., 3-4.
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Two predominant ways to analyze influences on news media
content are Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model, and Larry
Sabato's feeding frenzy approach.

The former is considerably

more controversial and focuses on mass media, while the
latter is widely accepted and focuses exclusively on the news
media.
Herman and Chomsky contend that the media serve the ends
of America's elite by systematically disseminating propaganda
and manufacturing the public's consent to an elite political
agenda. 10 Although their conclusion resembles a conspiracy
theory, Chomsky adamantly refutes such charges, "If I give an
analysis of, say, the economic system, and I point out that
General Motors tries to maximize profit and market share,
that's not a conspiracy theory, that's an institutional
analysis.... [T]hat's precisely the sense in which we are
talking about the media."H
However, Herman and Chomsky also stress that even though
the media may favor elite interest, the media "are not a
solid monolith on all issues."12

Members of the elite often

disagree, and political debate within the media reflects a
"diversity of tactical judgments [among elites] on how to
attain generally shared aims."13

Disagreement can be fierce

Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, xii.
11 Mark Archbar, ed. Manufacturing Consent: Noam
Chomsky and the Media (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1994),
131.
12 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, xii.
12 Ibid., xii.
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but opinions challenging the dominant ideology are
systematically excluded from media content by the press's
"selection of topics, distribution of concerns, framing of
issues, filtering of information, emphasis and tone, and by
keeping debate within the bounds of acceptable

principles.

The exclusion of dissenting opinions erodes the traditional
functions of the press, while favoring one of its more latent
functions —

manufacturing the consent of the

"disenfranchised

m a s s e s . "is

According to Chomsky, this latent function of the media
is necessary to legitimize the status quo.

Since the United

States is not a dictatorship, it is unable to ensure public
obedience by force.

Thus, its leaders must control public

thought and political debate because "thought can lead to
action and ... the threat to order must be exercised at the
source.

"16

Chomsky contends that it is necessary for the

elite to "establish a framework for possible thought that is
constrained within the principles of the state religion."i?
The "state religion" is the collective fundamental beliefs of
the citizenry.

For Americans these include rights to

property and free speech.

In Chcmsky's view, strict

adherence to these rights has sanctified the privileges of
those who own a majority of the country's capital and has
14 Ibid., 298.
15 Ibid., 1-2.
15 Noam Chomsky, The Chomsky Reader (New York:
Books, 1987), 132.
17 Ibid.

Pantheon
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defined the public's conception of democracy.

Thus, "It was

In the service of democracy" that the media —

radio,

television, and newspapers —

were "kept from the public

domain and handed over to a few huge corporations... ."is
Even though private ownership Influences media content,
It represents only one of five Interrelated Influences, or
filters, through which members of the elite can control the
media.

The five, outlined In Herman and Chcmsky's structural

analysis. Include:
(1) the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and
profit orientation of the domlnauit mass-medla firms; (2)
advertising as the primary Income source of the mass
media; (3) the reliance of the media on Information
provided by government, business, and "experts" funded
and approved by these primary sources and agents of
power; (4) "flak" as a means of disciplining the media;
and (5) "anticommunism" as a national religion and
control mechanism. 19
The result of raw Information passing through these filters
Is an elite Interpretation of reality that establishes "the
premises of discourse and Interpretation," controls the
political agenda, and defines "what Is newsworthy In the
first

p l a c e . "20

Sabato's approach differs significantly from that of
Herman and Chomsky's.

There Is no hint of

conspiracy In a

media feeding frenzy.

Instead, It Is "any political event or

circumstance where a critical mass of journalists leap to

Noam Chomsky, Powers and Prospects (Boston: South
End Press, 1996), 119.
Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 2.
20 Ibid.
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cover the same embarrassing or scandalous subject and pursue
it intensely, often excessively, and sometimes
uncontrollably."21
The effects of feeding frenzies vary according to the
event, or collection of events, they revolve around.

Since

the public's view of politics is, for the most part, a by
product of what they gather frcan the news media, feeding
frenzies can contribute to collective optimism or pessimism.
Thus, the ramifications of aggressive media coverage are not
all negative.

As Sabato explains, since Watergate there has

been an increased openness and accountability required of
politicians and government which has had some positive
effects on public awareness.

Unfortunately,

another

consequence has been press coverage that has contributed to
the trivialization of political discourse, because the press
often end up treating "venial sins and mortal sins as equals,
rushing to make every garden-variety scandal another
Watergate,"22

in effect much of the news is not news at all,

or as Sabato opines, "peccadilloes have supplanted policy on
the front pages," and this decivilizes politics.23
There are a variety of causes for feeding frenzies.

In

describing some of the difficulties encountered by the
Clinton administration, W. Lance Bennett suggests that a lack

21 Larry Sabato, Feeding Frenzy: How Attack Journalism
Has Transformed American Politics. (New York: The Free
Press, 1991) 6.
22 Ibid., 200, 208-209.
23 Ibid-
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of cooperation and unfavorable press relations between the
Administration and the Washington Press Corps fueled a series
of feeding frenzies.

Clinton and his staff were resentful

about their treatment by the press during the 1992 campaign.
Once in the White House, they attempted to "go over the
heads" of the press by holding electronic town hall meetings
and attempting to stage news events.

According to Bennett,

many members of the press felt that this "amounted to a
declaration of war on journalism's elite
there, other questionable mishaps —

c o r p s . "24

From

such as the Clintons'

involvement in Whitewater, a questionable land deal in
Arkansas —

became prime targets for feeding frenzies.

Bennett's observation suggests that media coverage of
the Clinton Administration, and perhaps the health care
debate itself, could be adequately explained by a feeding
frenzy.

However, it is helpful to understand that feeding

frenzies are the result of an "interplay of influences."
This term has been used by Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Karlyn
Kohrs Campbell to conceptualize media processes as societal
processes.

Thus the following chapters describe "not only

how the media influence us, but how the media are, in turn,
influenced by others —

individuals, groups, government

agencies, politicians, and other mass

m e d i a . "25

24 w. Lance Bennett, The Politics of Illusion 3rd ed.
(New York: Longman Publishers, 1996), 132-133.
25 Kathleen Hall Jamieson, and Karlyn Kohrs Campbell.
The Interplay of Influence; Mass Media & Their Publics in
News, Advertising, Politics. (Belmont, California; Wadsworth
Publishing Company, 1983), 1.
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However, it is still necessary to determine which
influences are significant, and to organize their
interactions.

One way to do this is to utilize a structural

approach based on the two types of studies mentioned earlier
—

content influence studies and process and effects studies.

This thesis combines the two, forming a relevant influences
and content effects approach.

This approach illustrates how

a feeding frenzy consumed President Clinton's health care
initiative, and leads to the conclusion that the media can
have an anti-democratic effect.
Two of Herman and Chcansky's "filters" were predominant
influences on media coverage of the health care debate:
"anticommunism" as a national ideology and control mechanism;
and "flak" as a means of keeping the media in line.

This is

not to say that the influence of the other filters —

the

media's profit orientation, their dependence on advertising
as a primary source of income, and their reliance on
information provided by government agencies, businesses, and
think tanks —

did not play a role in swaying media coverage.

However, their effects can be accounted for while focusing on
dominant ideology and flak.
Anti-Communistic themes easily translate into proAmerican themes, such as liberty, individuality and property
rights .26

since these concepts have competing definitions

they can not only be used freely, and often spuriously, but
they can also encompass dominant ideological themes.

When

26 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 29.
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Herman was questioned about limiting this conception to
"anti-Communism," he conceded that "dominant ideology" would
probably be more appropriate in extending the filter beyond
the nature of Cold War dichotomies, and to include elements
vital to established interests.

The reason he and Chomsky

chose to focus on anti-communism was because they "wanted to
focus on the ideological element that has been the most
important as a control and disciplinary mechanism in the U.S.
political

e c o n o m y . "27

Thus members of the mass media often

become dependent on dominant themes other than anti-communism
to communicate messages.

Therefore, this analysis utilizes

the conception of dominant ideological themes.
These themes are often appealed to by producers of
"flak," negative reactions to media commentary or programing
distributed through issue-orientated advertising, private
publications and expert opinions.

Most flak is subsidized by

businesses, organizations, interests groups, and thinktanks .28

Not surprisingly, Herman and Chcxnsky contend that

the dominant producers of flak are the established right wing
of American

p o l i t i c s . 29

Beth Schulman, associate publisher of

In These Times, a left-of-center publication, agrees since
they are better funded, "America's conservative
philanthropies eagerly fund the enterprise of shaping of

Monthly Review, January, 1989, as cited by Archbar, Noam
Chomsky and the Media, 108.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., 26-28.
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opinion and defining policy debates ... similar efforts by
progressive philanthropies are, by comparison,

sporadic."30

From 1990 to 1993, private grants to the leading political
magazines of the right wing, such as American Spectator and The
New Criterion, were eighty-two percent higher than private grants
to comparable magazines of the left wing, such as The Progressive
and The Nation.

John Tirman, director of the Winston Foundation

and a board member of the Foundation for National Progress, agrees
that the "right" influences government policy makers on a
"conveyor belt from think tanks, academics and activists,"
enabling them to dominate policy debates.3i
As will be discussed later, "flak" during the health care
debate was prevalent but it originated from anti-reform activists,
which differs significantly from the generic perception of
America's right wing.

In particular, many of the largest health

insurance corporations had supported President Clinton's proposed
universal, managed-care system, in which the government would set
certain guidelines for coverage to be delivered by private
insurance agencies.

To many in the health insurance industry,

managed competition seemed be preferable to a government takeover
of health care.32

30Beth Schulman, "Foundations for a Movement: How the Right
Wing Subsidizes its Press," Extra: The Magazine of FAIR.
March/April, 1995, 11.
31 Ibid., 11-12.
32 Jeff Cohen and Norman Solcmon, Through The Media
Looking Glass: Decoding Bias and Blather in the News
(Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995), 84-85.
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The Clinton Plan
By the 1992 Presidential election, the public had joined
many health insurers in realizing the need to reform health
care.

Fifteen percent of the population had no health care

insurance, many others feared that they too would lose their
coverage, and increasing medical costs were consuming twelve
percent of the nation's GNP and increasing budget deficits.33
On the eve of Clinton's inauguration, health care was second
only to the economy among the problems Americans wanted
addressed most.34

in fact, the findings of Harris and CBS/New

York Times polls suggested that governmental attention to
health care reform had been long overdue.

The polls found

that since 1982 seventy-five percent or more of the
population believed America's health care system needed to be
either fundcumentally changed or completely rebuilt.35
Early in the presidential primaries, candidate Clinton
neither embraced the untested idea of managed competition nor
33 Paul J. Quirk and Joseph Hinchliffe, "Domestic
Policy; The Trials of a Centrist Democrat" in The Clinton
Presidency: First Appraisals, ed. Colin Campbell and Bert A,
Rockmann (Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers,
1996), 274.
34 Robert J. Blendon, Mollyann Brodie, Tracey Stelzer
Hyams, and John M. Benson, "The American Public and the
Critical Choices for Health Care Reform," Journal of the
American Medical Association 271 (1994): 1539-44, as cited by
Paul J. Quirk and Joseph Hinchliffe, "Domestic Policy: The
Trials of a Centrist Democrat" in The Clinton Presidency, ed.
Campbell and Rockmann, 274.
35 Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Don't
Blame The Public for Failed Health Care Reform," Journal of
Health Politics, Policy and L a w . 20 n2 (Spring, 1995): 41617.
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a Canadian-style, "single-payer" health care system like that
supported by one of his opponents. Senator Robert Kerry.
(The term single-payer is used because all fees for health
services are channeled through one entity —

either the

federal or state government, or a regional organization.
Services are still provided by privately owned facilities.)36
Instead, Clinton tacitly supported a "play or pay"
approach which would require employers to either offer health
insurance to their workers or pay into a governmental fund to
expand coverage for uninsured Americans.

However, his

support for this approach decreased when he entered the
general election against President Bush and independent Ross
Perot.

Clinton wanted to campaign as a "New Democrat," but

Bush painted his "play or pay" approach as a tax and spend
program more characteristic of the old Democratic Party, and
Perot's recalcitrant budget cutting rhetoric seemed to
reinforce Bush's charges,37
By September, 1992, Clinton endorsed the idea of
managed competition.

According to Theda Skocpol the change

was Clinton's way of finding a middle ground between the
promise of universal coverage and the demands of the health
insurance industry.

Additionally, it seemed achievable

36 Theda Skocpol, Boomerang: Clinton's Health Security
Effort and the Turn against Government in U. S. Politics,
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996), 32.
37 Ibid., 34-39.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

16
because the idea had gained the political endorsement of
influential journalists and academic policy experts.38
Beginning in the summer of 1991, economist Dr. Michael
Winstein, a member of the New York Times editorial board, had
endorsed managed competition in more than two dozen of the
paper's editorials.39

in addition many of managed

competition's fundamentals had been envisioned by Stanford
economist Alain Enthoven, who formed the "Jackson Hole
group," made up representatives from the "Big Five" insurance
agencies —

Aetna, Cigna, Metropolitan Life, Prudential, and

Travelers.40
The ideas produced by the "Jackson Hole group" directly
influenced Clinton's Health Security Act.

They proposed

requiring employers to make payroll contributions to health
insurance premiums, financing expanded coverage.

Second,

they called for capping tax deductions for employer-provided
health benefit plans at the lowest-priced plan in a given
region, thereby forcing employers to invest in less expensive
plans or pay the difference.

Third, they wanted the

government to form guidelines establishing what types of
plans could be offered and for creating "health purchasing
alliances" among smaller businesses so they could purchase
insurance at lower rates.
38 Ibid., 41-42.
39
40
meeting
41

Ibid., 42.
Ibid., The group was named for sight of their first
in Jackson Hole, Wyoming.
Ibid., 42-43.
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The combination of these reforms would encourage the
spread of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), offering
basic and preventive care at reduced costs.

One addition the

Clinton camp made to the Jackson Hole group's outline was the
institution of global budget caps, or a cap on overall
government spending to ease the transition to the new
system. 42
A quasi-governmental health care system appealed to
Clinton for a number of reasons.

Politically, it was

important to have a plan that did not propose new taxes, and
did not completely relinquish private control of health care
to the government.

At the same time, Clinton was determined

to provide universal coverage, but he knew that this goal
could only be met if the plan simultaneously promoted cost
containment.

He also hoped that the approach would enable

his administration to attract the support of powerful health
industry interests for a plan that managed private
competition within a budget, without the political yoke of
increased taxes.43
During the campaign, Clinton was critical of President
Bush's proposal; "the Bush plan would put another $100
billion in tax credits through the same system between now
and 1997, pouring good money after bad, with no plan for cost
control."44

At the same time, he stressed that his own plan

42 Ibid., 43-44.
43 Ibid., 46.
44 Ibid., 45,
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was about "personal choice, private care, private insurance,
private management, but a national system to put a lid on
costs, to require insurance reforms, to facilitate
partnerships between business, government, and health care
providers."45
After Clinton's inauguration, however, "Grand ideals met
obdurate fiscal reality...."46

The intricacies of the plan

had not been mapped out, and only the basic outline had
survived the test of public opinion.

Thus, instead of

passing these general demands on to Congress, the President
decided to form a Health Care Task Force.

The first lady

acted as its public spokesperson and, along with longtime
friend Ira Magaziner, constructed the bill.

The

Administration believed that Congress, with its decentralized
power structure, would be unable to construct a
comprehensive health care package and unable to find that
"way through the middle" Clinton perceived was

t h e r e . 47

From the viewpoint of Representative Pat Williams, chair
of the Labor subcommittee, the President's proposal
represented a grand compromise, but it had political
ramifications:
The President obviously had a number of plans and
dozens of combinations to work with. In short he
could have presented any plan he wanted, and he was
being pulled this way and that by a lot of the
groups that had been interested in health care for

45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., 49.
47 Ibid., 49-55.
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almost fifty years.... Clinton, then, was the
Clinton that we now recognize better. He was the
Clinton of the middle.... When it all came crashing
down on him he frankly couldn't understand it for a
long time because he thought he had moved toward
the private health care industry.... He was going
to let them run it.
[However] I came to realize
very quickly that in order to properly provide
access, to all of our people ... you have to have
what on the surface appears to be a rather
complicated set of rules.... The notion that one
can reform health care access in America with very,
very simple minor standards is n o n s e n s i c a l . 48
Williams' insight begs many questions.

Could media

soundbites ever describe such a difficult piece of
legislation to the American public?

Could members of the

press overcome their tendency to trivialize policy debate?
Essentially, soundbites could have never been adequate, and
that in itself truncates the public's understanding of policy
matters.

However, the press's failure during the health care

debate transcended the media's inherent inadequacies.

Many

in the press were overly concerned with gossip, instead of
governance, focusing on titillation rather than inquiry.

The

result was the trivialization of the health care debate
rather than the enlightenment of the public.

48 Representative Pat Williams, interview by author, 25
April 1997, Missoula, Montana, tape recording.
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The Media's Failure
Part of the reason the plan "came crashing down" was the
media's portrayal of the President's proposal.

As James

Fallows contends, "the media failed in a historic way to help
America understand and decide on this issue."49

How the

media failed is explained in the following chapters.
Chapter Two, "Health Care is Un-American:

Anti-

Government Sentiment and the Liberal Myth," investigates how
media content was plagued with anti-government, anti-Clinton
and euiti-reform themes, and how this trivialized the
educational value of media reporting.

The media were more

concerned with focusing on the superficial aspects of the
debate, and portraying President Clinton's plan as a liberal,
bureaucratic approach to health care reform.

There was

little interest in probing or questioning the essence of the
proposed policy itself.

Much of what passed for public

information and policy discourse was an unprecedented amount
of negative propaganda.
Chapter Three, "Mountain of Misinformation:

The Media

and Anti-Reform Flak" discusses how the media failed to
critically evaluate misleading anti-government themes spread
by interest groups, talk radio programs, and academic think
tanks.

An example was the "Harry and Louise" ads funded by

Haynes Johnson and David Broder, The System; The
American Wav of Politics at the Breaking Point (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1996), 634.
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the Health Insurance Agency of America (HIAA). Their strategy
was simple:

play on American's distrust of government.

The

preponderance of anti-reform propaganda blended with the
media's concentration on the superficial aspects of the
debate, and culminated into a feeding frenzy.
The fourth chapter, "No Exit:

A Chart, A Scandal, And a

Bus Tour," analyzes four events during the health care debate
and exhibits how media content was fed by numerous

frenzies.

Members of the press were busy "gauging and guessing who
would win" on Capital Hill and "not in exploring what the
consequences would be for the country."SO

Haynes Johnson and

David Broder suggest that this type of reporting is a product
of the journalistic culture, "its professional mind-set and
its commercial, ccanpetitive pressures."si
The final chapter, "The Anti-Democratic Effects of
America's Media," elaborates on how the formation of media
content contributed to an anti-democratic debate.

In

addition, it highlights that there may not be an all
encompassing approach to media studies, no one element to be
pointed to, and no conspiracy to be uncovered.

However, if

one looks at how the interplay of dominant ideological thanes
and flak constructed much of media content during the health
care debate, one can uncover how a feeding frenzy engulfed
President Clinton's proposal.

Johnson and Broder, The System, 635.
51 Ibid., 634.
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CHAPTER 2
HEALTH CARE IS UN-AMERICAN:
ANTI-GOVERNMENT SENTIMENT AND THE LIBERAL MYTH

In her 1996 work. Boomerang;

Clinton's Health Security

Effort and the Turn against Government in U. S. Politics,
Theda Skocpol makes two observations about media coverage of
the health care debate.

First, anti-government themes, as

well as anti-Clinton themes, dominated media content and
demonized the administration's health care proposal.i

At the

same time, many journalistic accounts wrongly accused the
Clintons of "devising a liberal, big-government approach to
health care reform."2
Skocpol is correct, but one must also understand that
the media's attention to anti-Clinton and anti-government
themes was symptomatic of both the built up animosity many
journalists had for the Clinton administration, and of the
media's focusing, almost exclusively, on "the Clinton Plan."
The combination of these elements produced media content
lacking an in-depth and ongoing discussion of vital policy
issues.

Since the media did little to probe Clinton's plan,

or discuss alternative reforms, they did little to broaden
1
Effort
York:
2

Theda Skocpol, Boomerang: Clinton's Health Security
and the Turn against Government in U. S. Politics (New
W. W. Norton & Company, 1996), 146-152,
Ibid., 15.
22

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

23
the public's understanding of the debate's substance, or to
discredit misinformation about "the Clinton Plan."
The media's interweaving of anti-government themes and
liberal accusations portrayed the Clinton health package as
"a regulatory rat's nest, a nightmare of overambitious social
engineering, and a sweeping solution where modest reforms
would do."3

Essentially, "the Clinton Plan became the left-

wing alternative, not the comprehensive, econcmiically astute
package that it was.

As shown by a March, 1994, Wall Street

Journal-NBC News poll, many in the public could not support
"the Clinton Plan."

The poll found that forty-five percent

of those surveyed opposed President Clinton's Health Care
Security Act, yet seventy-six percent favored an unlabeled
plan which contained all the essential elements of Clinton's
proposal.

The Wall Street Journal concluded;

"Mr. Clinton

is losing the battle to define his own health-care bill."4
However, the failure was not solely President Clinton's.

The

downfall of health care reform was exacerbated by journalists
fanning the flames of discontent.

This disdain for the

Clinton Administration began well before the bill was
introduced in September, 1993.
Antipathy toward government has always been a dcaninant
ideological theme in American political thought, and these
emotions can manifest in many ways —

animosity, bitterness.

^ James Fallows, A Triumph of Misinformation," Atlantic
Monthly, 275 nl (January, 1995): 32.
^ Hilary Stout, "Many Don't Realize It's the Clinton
Plan They Like," Wall Street Journal, 10 March 1994, 1(B) and
6(B).
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spite, fear.5

in an August, 1992, memo to candidate Clinton,

Senator Jay Rockefeller astutely recognized the importance of
the public's psychology:

"Voters fear losing coverage from

loopholes, job changes, layoffs or catastrophic illness....
Fear, much more than compassion, drives support for universal
guarantees of coverage" (emphasis

added).6

However,

Rockefeller also warned Clinton that their fear was offset by
an equal threat:

"Before long they will be asking:

would we pay for all that care for all those people?
it require a huge new government

b u r e a u c r a c y ? "7

How
Won't

So for many

the debate became a choice of whom do you fear more, the
insurance companies or the government?
Kathleen Hall Jamieson contends that the media increased
the public's fear of "the Clinton Plan."

The press rarely

focused on the policy issues of reform, and when they did,
they failed to investigate competing solutions.

The media

opted to concentrate on the attacks and counter-attacks
forged by the proponents and adversaries of President
Clinton's proposal.

According to Jamieson, this

5 See Samuel Adams, "The Rights of the Colonists," in
American Political Thought, 3rd ed., ed. Kenneth M. Dolbeare
(Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1996), 3741; Thomas Jefferson, "First Inaugural Address," in American
Political Thought, 184-187; Henry David Thoreau, "Civil
Disobedience," in American Political Thought, 231-246;
William Graham Sumner, "What Social Classes Owe to Each
Other," in American Political Thought, 341-356.
^ Haynes Johnson and David Broder, The System: The
American Wav of Politics at the Breaking Point (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1996), 92.
7 Ibid., 93.
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concentration bred public skepticism, and left many saying to
themselves, "Gee, everything is awful.
believe in.

I have nothing I can

Let's just reject the whole bunch of them.

Let's just reject the whole

p r o c e s s . "8

However, there is evidence to suggest that long before
the public's rejection of "the whole process," a pack of
journalists had already begun to feed around a turbulent
White House.

Only five months into his presidency, magazine

headlines were denouncing President Clinton and his
administration.

The cover of the June 7, 1993, issue of

Newsweek depicted a perplexed Bill Clinton —
one hand on his chin, gazing downward.
simple banner, "What's Wrong?"9

arms crossed,

Above him read the

That same week, a miniature

of President Clinton was pictured on the bottom of the cover
of Time.

Arms behind his back, he gazed upward at the bold

headline, "THE INCREDIBLE SHRINKING PRESIDENT."10
Most of the initial turmoil for the Clinton
Administration was not directly related to health care
reform.

Moreover, media coverage is not the result of a

single event, but the interplay of events.

Initial

journalistic accounts of the administration set the tone for
the media's coverage of health care reform.

Journalists

zeroed in on the administration's blunders and fed public

® The Great Health Care Debate, part of The Moyers
Collection, (Princeton: Films for the Humanities and
Sciences, 1994). videotape.
^ Newsweek, 7 June 1993.
Time, 7 June 1993.
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cynicism.

The media was not wholly to blame because

Clinton's agenda was ambitious. As Barbara Sinclair notes,
"if several major efforts are going on at once, press
coverage is even less predictable and more likely than usual
to be harmful.... [TJhe press [chooses] the big story of the
day and will almost always select the negative over the
positive.

Consequently, conducting several such campaigns

simultaneously is nearly impossible,
A brief overview of a few of these episodes —

gays in

the military, the failed nomination of Lani Guinier, and
Travelgate —

underscores how an interplay of events

influences media coverage, and demonstrates how media content
contributed to the public's negative reaction to "the Clinton
Plan."

Eventually, there seemed "to be an almost visceral

level of mistrust and dislike for Clinton, a rejection of him
not as a leader or politician but as a

p e r s o n . " 12

As

controversies multiplied and the journalistic tone was set,
vital questions concerning the administration's character,
its honesty and the public's trust were never far from the
headlines.

H B a r b a r a Sinclair, "Trying to Govern Positively in a
Negative Era,"in The Clinton Presidency;
First Appraisals,
ed. Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockmann (Chatham, New Jersey:
Chatham House Publishers, 1996), 112.
12George C. Edwards, "Frustration and Folly: Bill
Clinton and the Public Presidency," in Campbell and Rockman
The Clinton Presidency, 240.
13 Ibid.
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The first controversy to arise came only two weeks after
Clinton had taken the oath of office.

During the campaign,

he had promised to reverse the ban on homosexuals in the
United States Armed Forces.

Even though it was not a high

priority on his agenda, the issue warranted media attention
because the Democrats were fiercely split on the President's
position and it was easily explained in a headline or sound
bite.
One of the most en^hatic antagonists of lifting the ban
was Senate Armed Services Ccxnmittee Chairman Sam Nunn.

He

"took on the newly elected president of his party vocally and
publicly; for doing so, he received an enormous amount of
media a t t e n t i o n . H o w e v e r , Representative Ron Dellums,
Nunn's counterpart in the House, supported the President but
received nowhere near the attention Nunn's vigorous
opposition did.

Dellums complained, "If you read the paper.

I'm not even there."is
Eventually President Clinton backed down, opting instead
to allow homosexuals to serve as long as they concealed their
sexual preference (a policy known as "don't ask don't tell").
By doing so he impaled himself on a double-edged political
sword.

Adversaries tabbed Clinton a liberal, gay rights

supporter, while gay activists accused him of failing to keep
Sinclair, "Trying to Govern Positively," 101.
15 Jim Naureckas, "Ask Not What Gays Will Do to the
Military — Ask What the Military is Doing to Gays," in Jim
Naureckas and Janine Jackson, eds. The Fair Reader; An
Extra1 Review of Press and Politics in the 9 0 's (Boulder,
Co.: Westview Press Inc., 1996), 169.
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a campaign p r o m i s e . N e i t h e r of these themes would play well
during the battle over health care reform.
More controversy arose frcwa another of Clinton's
campaign pledges :
like America."

to appoint an administration that "looked

In April, 1993, Clinton nominated Lani

Guinier, an African-American female and personal friend of
the Clintons, to head the Justice Department's Civil Rights
division.

Her nomination "became a lightning rod for

political conflict."17

At the time she was a University of

Pennsylvania Law Professor, but she had also worked for the
Carter administration and for the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People's (NAACP) Legal Defense and
Educational Fund.

During her career, Guinier had written

many scholarly articles advocating minority voting rights,
increasing black representation and intensifying minority
group participation in legislative bodies. 18
Much of the nation was introduced to Ms. Guinier in a
April 30, 1993 opinion-editorial by Clint Bolick, entitled
"Clinton's Quota Queens."

Bolick contended that Guinier's

appointment represented a Clinton payback to "extreme leftwing elements."

According to Bolick, her scholarly works

showed that she had an "in-your-face civil rights agenda"

Graham K. Wilson, "The Clinton Administration and
Interest Groups," in Campbell and Rockman, The Clinton
Presidency, 223.
David M. O'Brien, "Clinton's Legal Policy and the
Courts : Rising from Disarray or Turning Around and Around?,"
in The Clinton Presidency, Campbell and Rockmann , 130.
18 Ibid.
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that would "further polarize an already divided nation.
Newsweek columnist George Will echoed Bolick's concern,
accusing Guinier of believing that "the Voting Rights Act is
violated by any legislative body where measures favored by
certain government-approved minorities are often defeated . " 20
Unfortunately, Bolick and Will, like much of the
mainstream press, were guilty of selectively reading
Guinier^s work.

She had also written that empowering

minorities at the polls did not "require legislative setasides, color-coded ballots, electoral quotas or ^one black,
two votes' remedies. "21
done.

Unfortunately, the damage had been

The catchy phrase "quota queen" caught on, and the

racially loaded term was often used by journalists referring
to Ms. Guinier.

It ccxabined the "welfare queen" stereotype

with "quota," a term President Bush grappled with prior to
the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights A c t .22

All of this did

not deter George Will from suggesting that Guinier's
nomination was "just another day in the 'reinvention of

Clint Bolick, "Clinton's Quota Queens," Wall Street
Journal, 30 April 1993, 12(A).
20 George Will, "Sympathy for Guinier," Newsweek, 14
June 1993, 78.
21 Lani Guinier, "Keeping the Faith: Balck Voters in
the Post-Reagan Era," Harvard Civil Rights Civil Liberties
Law Review, 24 (Spring 1989): 393.
22 Rob Richie and Jim Naureckas, "Lani Guinier: Quota
Queen or Misquoted Queen?," in Naureckas and Jackson, The
Fair Reader, 133.
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government' by a 'New Democrat'.... Next this lot will 'fix'
the economy and 'reform' the health care system.

Hang on."23

Will's warning to "hang on" may have evoked images of a
wild ride yet to come, but it was also ironic considering
that on May 19, 1993 the seven-person staff of the White
House travel-office was fired due to allegations of
wrongdoings.

The office is in charge of scheduling charter

flights for the White House Press Corps who accompany the
President on official duties, and for making hotel
reservations for Executive aides.

Members of the office were

under FBI investigation for embezzling some eighteen-thousand
dollars.

During the investigation it was discovered that

Harry Thomason, a friend of the Clintons and Hollywood
producer, was trying to gain some of the airline charter
business for his friends.

At the same time, travel-office

employee Catherine Cornelius, a distant cousin of the
President, had proposed that the office be reorganized with
herself as its head.

In the mainstreaun press, these stories

became know as "Travelgate. "24
Since the travel-office provided "first-class creature
comforts ... to reporters on presidential trips," any change
in its personnel was sure to affect the professional lives of

2 3 George Will, "Sympathy for Guinier," 78.
24 George J. Church, "Flying Blind," Time. 7 June 1993,
28., and Eleanor Clift and Mark Miller, "Don't Mess With the
Media: The White House press corps gets its revenge,"
Newsweek, 7 June 1993, 23.
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the White House Press

C o r p s . 25

ABC journalist Brit Hume

voiced his dissatisfaction a few weeks after the shakeup by
asking why the press had been served cold food on a recent
White House charter flight, "a mere croissant, yogurt, and
fruit."26

Not long after, there were one-hundred-sixty-nine

questions about Travelgate during a White House press
briefing, "far more than there were about the prospects for
the president's $246 billion tax bill...."27
The press's antipathy for the Clinton-way of doing
things segued into their antipathy for the health care reform
process.

In early May, 1993, Ira Magaziner and First Lady

Hillary Clinton wanted to finish the health care proposal and
send it on to Congress.

However, most of the White House

staff wanted nothing to distract attention, primarily media
attention, from the battle for the President's budget
proposal on Capital Hill.

Eventually the First Lady agreed

to exclude the press from the health care task force
meetings.

She recalled how she had been badly criticized by

the press during the 1992 campaign and she did not want the
same to happen to either the President's budget or health
care reform.

She justified the press lockout in an April,

1993 speech, "the bane of all people in political life ... is
the unfair, unjust, inaccurate reporting that goes on from

25 Stanley W. Cloud, "Clinton vs. the Press," Time, 7
June 1993, 27.
25 Clift and Miller, "Don't Mess With the Media," 23.
27 Ibid.
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coast to coast."28

According to journalists Haynes Johnson

and David Broder, the secrecy policy was a major mistake that
"ultimately deprived the public of essential information on
which to form judgments," and created a "cloud of public
suspicion."29
Locking out the press lead to a number of damaging, and
often misleading, leaks.

One of the more serious incidents

concerned three charts detailing three reform options.

The

first outlined the projected inflationary effect each of the
three plans would have on national spending, the highest
being an initial increase of fifty-billion dollars which
would eventually increase to one-hundred-billion.

The second

chart depicted the potential savings that each option would
gain, and the third estimated the net effect of each option
on the federal budget.
the first chart —

Johnson and Broder claim that only

regarding the increasing costs of

Clinton's reform ideas —

was leaked to the New York Times.

To ccanpound this breach, the chart was modified, making it
appear to call for a one-hundred-fifty-billion dollar
increase in taxes.

A footnote which stated "in unmistakeüsle

uppercase letters" that projected cost increases were "before
any calculation of savings" had been blacked out.30

28 As cited by Haynes Johnson and David Broder, The
System; The American Wav of Politics at the Breaking
Point, (Boston; Little, Brown and Company, 1996), 137, 140.
29 Johnson and Broder, The System, 140, 142.
30 Ibid., 140-141.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

33
Without access to the footnote, or consulting the other
two charts, the May 3 edition of the New York Times ran a
critical front page headline:

"HEALTH-CARE COSTS MAY BE

INCREASED $100 BILLION A YEAR."

The article, by Robert Pear,

lacked an in-depth analysis of the reasoning behind
increasing expenditures or the benefits increased investments
might bring about.

Pear also maintained that some Clinton

administration officials were urging their budgetary experts
to reduce the cost estimates because the increases would be
politically impossible to a c h i e v e . T h i s insight suggests
that he relied on more than the one chart to write his
article.

Of course, writing about the embattled

administration's balanced approach to health care reform —
which was revealed by the missing charts, and the lost
footnote —

would not have landed his story on the front page

of one of the nation's leading newspapers.
In fact, the accusation that there was a shroud of
secrecy around the task force implies that it was some sort
of conspiracy, which it was not.

Nor is Johnson and Broder's

contention that this somehow deprived the public of essential
information and created a cloud of public suspicion
completely accurate.

The task force actually went out of its

way to hear a variety of interests on matters of substance.
Only four months into Clinton's term, the task force had
already met with 572 organizations.

The headline on the May

twenty-second issue of the Congressional Quarterly read
31 Robert Pear, "Health Care Costs May be Increased $100
Billion a Year," New York Times, 3 May 1993, 1(A).
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"CLINTON TASK FORCE ALL EARS ON THE SUBJECT OF OVERHAUL."

In

September, when Hillary Clinton testified on behalf of health
cêure reform before five congressional committees, "not a
single legislator complained about the 'closed' or
'secretive' deliberations:

not Bob Dole, not Robert

Packwood, not John Danforth ... Republican Senators who all
later came out against the bill."32
Despite consulting many organizations and a lack of
conspiratorial assertions from legislators, journalist Dana
Priest, who covered the task force for the Washington Post,
continued to suggest that the Clintons "hurt themselves a
lot, because the idea formed that they were creating a
'secret

p l a n . "'33

More pointed accusations came from radio

talk show host Rush Limbaugh who professed that "anybody who
disagrees with any aspect of [the Clinton] plan is being
attacked. "34
Part of the problem is that there are inherent problems
with detailed press coverage.

With an almost concessionary

tone, Johnson and Broder admit that
[I]t was a story that required detailed,
persistent, imaginative coverage for people to
understand how it affected them ... For the print
press, which should have had more time to prepare
longer in-depth articles, it was ... a challenging
assignment to help the public understand the stakes
involved and to sort out fact from propaganda in
the political battle for public opinion,... Too
often the print press failed to meet the challenge;
32 Fallows, "A Triumph of Misinformation," 28
33 Johnson and Broder, The System, 142.
34 Great Health Care Debate, videotape.
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coverage was desultory, inconsistent, or focused on
the political points being scored by opposing
sides.... For television, by nature a fragmentary
medium for conveying information, with increasing
emphasis on entertainment as news and "sound bites"
featuring conflict, charge, and countercharge as
news highlights, this story was nearly
impossible. 35
The closed door policy did make these inherent
complications worse because it excluded the one group that
mattered the most, the press.

Despite their importance,

veteran journalist James Fallows contends that even if
keeping out the Washington Press Corps was a "stupid" idea it
far from justified journalists depicting the task force as
being a secret organization, a naive collection of liberal
intellectuals or a closed-minded group of elites.36
Essentially, the decision to keep the press at bay during the
early stages of policy formation did not warrant the media
misrepresenting reality.
Misleading depictions did not end after the task force
had finalized their reform proposal.

As mentioned above,

journalistic accounts interwove anti-government themes, such
as the shroud of secrecy, and the administration's closedminded approach, with liberal accusations, portraying the
Clinton health package as "a regulatory rat's nest," and
"overambitious social engineering."37

Thus, to many the 1993

Health Care Security Act became the left-wing reform plan.

35 Johnson and Broder, The System, 143.
36 Fallows, "A Triumph of Misinformation," 29.
37 Ibid., 32.
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This was perpetuated by media content that practically
excluded advocates of a Canadian-style, single-payer health
care system, a more liberal solution than President
Clinton's.
As mentioned in chapter one, the Clinton team steered
away from a single-payer proposal, even though eighty-nine
House Democrats had already signed on the bill sponsored by
Representative McDermott.38

The administration wanted to

maintain Clinton's image as a "New Democrat" and they feared
that opponents could easily portray a single-payer proposal
as an unnecessary federal takeover of health care that would
increase the national debt.
The strategy was intended to satisfy two related ends.
First, it was supposed to create a compromise position,
situated between full-fledged socialized medicine and the
present free market system.

Second, by starting with a

compromise the Clinton administration hoped that the package
would avoid being labeled a big government program proposed
by a tax-and-spend, liberal Democrat.

The administration did

not foresee that the nature of the plan, with its intricate
and interlocking regulations, would give "right-wing
government haters" adequate ammunition to contend that it
would only increase taxes, create an unnecessary, intrusive
governmental bureaucracy and destroy "the best health care
system in the

w o r l d . "39

For the most part, the media

38 Johnson and Broder, The System, 43.
39 Skocpol, Boomerang. 178.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

37
exacerbated this reaction by marginalizing advocates of a
single-payer health care reform package.
The quieting of these dissenting opinions perpetuated
the liberal myth.

Even while media content was failing to

represent all sides of the health care debate, members of the
media championed America's pluralistic system.

On PBS's

"MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour," anchor Margaret Warner proclaimed
that "interest groups on all sides of the issue have taken to
the

a i r w a v e s . "40

in

reality, an advertisement supporting a

single-payer system, funded by the interest group Neighbor to
Neighbor, was kept off television stations in San Francisco,
Boston, and Washington

D.C.41

The ad depicted a living room setting, with an elderly
woman sitting in her easy chair next to a fire.

As the

camera zoomed in, the woman spoke tenaciously, "Listen, why
don't we get rid of the health insurance companies.
to the blackboard."

Let's go

Using her walking cane as a pointer,

"Here's what we spend on health care.

It's a lot!"

She

directs the viewers attention to the board:
Single-Payer
$900 Billion

Jeff Cohen and Norman Solomon, Through The Media
Looking Glass; Decoding Bias and Blather in the News
(Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995), 86.
41 Ibid.
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"But if we get rid of the insurance companies, we can have
complete coverage for everyone for the same money."

The

graphic on the board changes:
Insurance Companies
$900 Billion
+ $100 Billion
Sales Tax
Benefits Tax
Payroll Tax
"Any plan that keeps these guys in business will cost
billions in taxes, taxes, taxes.

To me it's a no-brainer."

The ad closed by picturing the words "Health Insurance
Companies," encircled and slashed through in red.

A deep,

forewarning, male voice cautioned, "It's time for them to go.
Call Congress today."42
Kathleen Hall Jamieson contends that the reason this
single-payer ad never "saw the light of day" was because
health insurers brought pressure against those wanting to run
them.
Insurance Agencies are major advertisers— . They can
put economic pressure on stations not to air ads such as
this and because those ads aren't protected legally,
[insurance agencies] can threaten lawsuits against
stations who air them, saying they are misleading. Now
what that means in the debate is that this ad which says
lets get rid of insurance companies won't air but —
ads for the insurance industry [will air].... That means
we have incentives, that are legal incentives inside the
system, for large corporations to be given access to the

42 Great Health Care Debate, videotape.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

39
airwaves and those who oppose them not, and that is a
problem if one believes in balanced debate.43
The reasons given by station managers for not airing the
single-payer ad confirms Jamieson's contention.

They claimed

that the ad was "a call to action," "too broad," and
"undocumented."

One even explained that running the ad would

be prohibitive because many of their major advertisers are
health insurers,
the insurance

and "we don't want to take any hits from

c o m p a n i e s ."44

of course, stations did not

routinely turn down ads from the health insurance
corporations for the same reasons, because that would have
directly cut revenues.
To make matters worse, news programming rarely mentioned
a single-payer alternative.

For instance, in all of 1993,

ABC's "World News Tonight with Peter Jennings" mentioned the
proposal only once.45 when a Canadian single-payer health
care system was discussed it was likely to be discarded
without question.

From July, 1993, to November, 1994, the

proposal was referred to only twice on ABC's "Nightline."
One of these occasions was a featured interview with
President Clinton.

Anchor Ted Koppel suggested to the

President that many Canadians were coming to the United
States for health care.

According to Koppel, America's

northern neighbors were saying, "Whatever you do, don't
Ibid.

86

.

Cohen and Solomon, Through The Media Looking Glass,
45 Ibid., 85.
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exchange what you've got for what we've got."

Actually, a

Gallup poll taken a few days earlier had shown that only two
percent of Canadians preferred the American health care
system to their

o w n . 46

Koppel had also overlooked that

Representative McDermott's single-payer proposal had gained
the support of eighty nine members of the

H o u s e . 47

By marginalizing single-payer advocates the media
effectively disqualified one solution to the debate.

Even

though the press might have easily explained how a Canadiantype system would reduce bureaucracy, cut costs, provide
universal coverage, and still allow patients to choose their
own doctors, they rarely discussed it.48

Ironically, these

ingredients are what much of the American public wanted from
health care reform.49
However, a single-payer plan went against those voices
in the debate with the ability to speak the loudest, namely,
the majority of the health insurance industry.

Thus, members

of the media, who might have considered discussing the plan
seriously, could have lost credibility if they had done so.
They could have been accused of a liberal media bias and of
championing a socialist health care system.

Thus, most of

the media chose to zero in on the Clinton proposal, which
46 "Nightline," March 1, 1994 as cited by Jim Naureckas
and Janine Jackson, eds. The Fair Reader: An Extra! Review
of Press and Politics in the 9 0 's (Boulder, Co.: Westview
Press Inc., 1996), 169.
Johnson and Broder, The System, 43.
48 Skocpol, Boomerang. 178.
49 Johnson and Broder, The System. 632-633,
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effectively edited a great deal of the debate because many
House Members had already signed on to a single-payer bill.so
The single-payer advocates were lost in the fray and the
American public was left uninformed about one workable
solution to health care reform.
For all practical purposes, the exclusion of the single
payer proposal created a contextual void in media content.
Since journalists often narrow policy debate to political
dichotomies, they needed a "liberal" plan.

Considering that

many of the established members of the media had a growing
animosity for the administration, many of them had little
problem characterizing "the Clinton Plan" as the "liberal"
alternative.

If single-payer advocates would have been given

the same media time that antagonists of Clinton's plan were
allotted, then the liberal myth would not have gained such
distinction.
Thus, a full-blown media myth was born, as basic truths
were edited.

The Health Security Act of 1993 was not cooked

up by Hillary Clinton and her liberal cronies, rather it was
adapted from a managed competition blueprint drawn up by the
representatives of the "Big Five" insurance companies —
Aetna, Cigna, Metropolitan Life, Prudential and Travelers.
One of the representatives noted that the only way to avoid a
government takeover of health care, and avoid a Canadian
style-system, was to eliminate the present multiple-payer

50 Ibid., 43.
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private insurance industry, and replace it with a system of
managed competition.si
However, the "Big Five" had already begun forming Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), an essential ingredient to
the President's proposal, and they were assured a major role
in a health care system founded on a business-government
partnership.

Members of the Health Insurance Association of

America (HIAA), which consisted of small to medium-sized
health insurers, were not so confident.

They feared that

"managed competition" would manage them out of business, or
that they would at least lose more of their business to the
"Big Five."52
HIAA's response was to produce flak —

a multi-million

dollar media campaign against Clinton's health care reform.
Their most effective weapon was a series of now infamous
advertisements known as the "Harry and Louise" ads.
chapter, "Mountain of Misinformation:

The next

The Media and Anti

reform Flak," concentrates on the producers of flak.

As

Skocpol notes, anti-reform flak spread "from think tanks to
popular media and from elites to groups with a geographically
dispersed grassroots presence."53

51 Cohen and Solomon, Through The Media Looking Glass.
84-85.
52 Ibid.
53 Skocpol, Boomerang, 146.
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CHAPTER 3
MOUNTAIN OF MISINFORMATION:
THE MEDIA AND ANTI-REFORM FLAK

Opponents to health care reform used flak as a way of
"playing on, and intensifying, public distrust of
government," and too often their propaganda, accurate or not,
went unadulterated.!

The following assesses the influence of

two sources of flak during the health care debate —
political advertisements, and radio talk shows —
they influenced media content.

and how

However, this flak was not,

as Herman and Chomsky would contend, a pure function of elite
propaganda which kept the media in line .2
Flak during the health care debate occurred in the
context of what David Truman termed a "political
disturbance," or an identifiable event that challenges the
status quo and compels those adversely affected into action.3
Health care reform threatened many established business
interests and health care providers.

They responded by

1 Haynes Johnson and David Broder, The System: The
American Wav of Politics at the Breaking Point (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1996), 92.
2 Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturinq
Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1988), 26-28.
2 David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York:
Knopf, 1951), 88.
43
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producing political advertisements critical of the plan, and
their accusations were often reinforced by conservative talk
radio.

These forms of propaganda were intended not only to

sway public opinion but also to sway the opinion of
legislators and members of the media.

Often, advertisers and

talk radio hosts would appeal to public doubts about the
ability of government to solve the health care problem.

Such

appeals contributed to a level of confusion and mistrust
surrounding President Clinton and his reform package.
Kathleen Hall Jamieson suggests that advertising and
talk radio exemplified the larger problems with the health
care debate itself.

One could often trace the lines of

political propaganda from the Republican National Committee,
or a conservative interest group in Washington, to talk show
host Rush Limbaugh, or to the editorial page of the Wall
Street Journal, or even back through the

circuit.4

Whether

or not these lines of rhetoric were intended is debatable.
What is important is that their similarities hindered the
public's ability to hear multiple sides of the debate.

The

average citizen had "no way to say yes I favor this over
that, or say I've heard all the arguments ... and I don't
think any of them solve the overarching problem. "5
Although reform opponents may have played on the
public's cynicism, they were not highly effective in changing
^ The Great Health Care Debate, part of The Moyers
Collection, (Princeton: Films for the Humanities and
Sciences, 1994). videotape, and Johnson and Broder, The
System, 197.
5 Ibid.
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the type of health care package the public demanded.

As the

Wall Street Journal-NBC news poll cited in Chapter Two shows,
forty-five percent of the public had turned against the
President's proposal but seventy-six percent continued to
demand its essential elements when they were not connected to
"the Clinton Plan."6
However, political advertisements and talk radio did
influence key decision makers.

In a 1995 survey commissioned

by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, prominent members
of both Houses of Congress were questioned about the
influential factors leading to the demise of health care
reform.

Responding to the question, "In your opinion, did

each of the following have a great deal, seme, not very much,
or no influence on the outcome of the congressional debate on
health care reform?," fifty-five percent said that
advertising by interest groups had a great deal of influence
and thirty-six percent said it had some

influence.7

When asked, "Of the media sources, which specific one or
two do you believe had the most influence in the outcome of
the health care debate?," the number one response was radio
talk shows, cited by forty-six percent of the respondents,
and most of them specifically mentioned Rush Limbaugh.

The

^ Hilary Stout, "Many Don't Realize It's the Clinton
Plan They Like," Wall Street Journal. 10 March 1994, 1(B) and
6(B).
7 Orval Hansen and others, eds., "Lawmakers' Views on
the Failure of Health Reform: A Survey of Members of
Congress and Staff," Journal of Health Politics, Policv and
Law 21, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 142.
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second closest response was newspapers, with thirty-eight
percent (fifteen percent going to the New York Times, eleven
percent to the Wall Street Journal, and four percent each to
the Washington Post, the Washington Times and the Los Angeles
Times).8
Influencing the decision making process was what many
special interests set out to do.

The HIAA's executive

president, Willis Gradison Jr., had an insider's view of how
his group could be successful.

Gradison had served as a

member of the House for eighteen years and had become an
influential voice for the minority party on the Ways and
Means Committee, and its Health Subcommittee.

In 1992, after

the moderate Republican lost election to a minor leadership
post in the House Republican caucus, he decided to leave the
House.

Soon thereafter he accepted a post as president of

the HIAA.9
The HIAA developed a series of advertisements popularly
known as the "Harry and Louise" ads.

Ben Goddard, the

producer of the ads, admits that the HIAA targeted a certain
audience, "We bought time on CNN and Headline News, CNBC,
Rush Limbaugh, and in New York, Washington, and Los Angeles.
We wanted to get on the agenda of the national media ...
where editors and reporters who decide the news live."lo
8 Ibid., 145.
^ Johnson and Broder, The System, 53, 69, 198-199.
^8 Darell M. West, Diane Heith and Chris Goodwin, "Harry
and Louise Go to Washington: Political Advertising and
Health Care Reform," Journal of Health, Politics, Policv and
L a w , (Spring 1996): 43.
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Many other advertisers followed HIAA's strategy.

As Jamieson

notes, roughly twenty-five percent of the country received
concentrated advertising attention, "and those people were in
the key districts of the members of the major committees that
were going to act on health care legislation.
HIAA's first ad began with a younger couple sitting at
their kitchen table covered with loose papers, a couple of
note pads, and a calculator.

A pencil in his right hand, the

man taps at the calculator with his left.

The woman, wipes

her brow, and exclaims, "This was covered under our old
plan."
it."

The man replies, "Oh yeah, that was a good one wasn't

A foreboding voice chimes in, "Things are changing, and

not all for the better.

The government may force us to pick

from a few health care plans designed by government
bureaucrats."

The actors respond.

Woman:

we don't like is no choice at all."
Woman:

"We lose."

Man:

"Having choices
"They choose."

The man brakes his pencil in half, and

the woman scratches her head as the camera zooms out.

The

narrator concludes, "For reforms that protect what we have
call toll free.

Know the facts.

If we let the government

reform health care, we lose."i2
This first installation of the HIAA's advertisements
began running before the President even presented the Health
Security Act to a joint session of Congress on September 22,

The Great Health Care Debate, videotape.
12 Ben Goddard, "Changes Alternate #2," (Claussen/First
Tuesday productions, 1993), video recording obtained from the
Health Insurance Association of America.
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1993.

Whether or not the HIAA had access to one of the

leaked copies of the President's proposal is unknown.
However, it is important to recognize that the "Harry and
Louise" ads quickly got the attention of other adversaries of
"the Clinton Plan."

As noted in the New York Times, the

HIAA's advertising campaign "quickly attracted the ire of
competing special interest groups."13

Through the use of

advertising, different adversaries began to accuse "the
Clinton Plan" of various deficiencies, while offering no
alternative proposals.

Piece by piece, they took the plan

apart, until there was nothing left.

The press's attention

to various advertising campaigns increased the potency of the
attacks.
In fact, the press added to the HIAA's advertising
campaign by actually giving the series its catchy name.

The

original script identified "Harry" and "Louise" as merely
"He" and "She."

Only after members of the press had obtained

a copy of the script, which listed the two actors by name,
Harry Johnson and Louise Caire, did reporters write about the
"Harry and Louise" ads, which is easier to report on than
reporting about that young couple sitting at their kitchen
table discussing the nation's health care problems.

Without

media coverage of the ads, Americans may never have discussed
"Harry and Louise.

Clifford Kraus, "Lobbyist of Every Stripe Turning to
Grass Roots on Health Care," New York Times, 24 September
1993, 20(A).
14 Johnson and Broder, The System, 205.
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The second "Harry and Louise" ad appeared in November.
It also began with the couple sitting at their breakfast
table.

Harry, casually turning pages of his newspaper, says,

"Well, I'm glad the President is doing something about health
care reform."

Louise, flipping through a copy of the

President's Health Security A c t , replies, "He's right, we
need it."

Harry:

"But some of these details."

yellow highlighter in hand:
care?"

Louise,

"Like a national limit on health

She begins to highlight lines of the President's plan

and explains, "The government caps how much spending on
health care and says,
better way."

'that's i t . ' ... There's got to be a

A phone number appears on the screen, under the

bold banner, "A Better Way to Reform. "

The narrator

concludes, "There is a better way to reform.

Call this toll

free number for the facts...."is
The HIAA's simple, cost-effective strategy —

to target

certain members of the media and to target certain
legislative districts —

had a rippling effect.

According to

Gloria Borger, of U. S. News and World Report, the ads played
a big part in the psychological crossfire of the health care
debate.

In general, members of Congress are familiar with

the power of television because most of them have used it in
elections.

They are also aware that special interest groups

can easily use advertising against them.

However, their

attention to advertising can lead them astray because some
Ben Goddard, "Yes But II," (Claussen/First Tuesday
productions, 1993), video recording obtained from the Health
Insurance Association of America.
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campaigns may actually be ineffective, and "members can get
conned if they believe the public is listening.
Borger believes that is exactly what happened during the
health care debate.

The "Harry and Louise" ads show how

health care reform became a debate between elites, and not a
conversation between the voters and their leaders.

The

advertisers stirred up Washington and the press stirred up
the public.

As Borger suggests, "Harry and Louise would just

have been two more whiny yuppies had the media not taken up
their lament."i?
The "Harry and Louise" ads were so feared by
legislators, that former House Ways and Means Chairman Dan
Rostenkowski negotiated with the HIAA to keep the ads out of
the districts of two prominent ccxnmittee members.

Since

Gradison, HIAA's president, was a former member of the
committee it is likely that there was a substantial amount of
communication between he and Rostenkowski.

Chuck Lewis of

the Center for Public Integrity, suggests that not only is
this metaphorical for the cozy relationship between the
health industry and the federal government, but it also
exhibits how effective advertising can be.

Gradison was able

to "bludgeon public policy in the direction of his industry.

Gloria Borger, "Stupid Advertising Tricks," U. S.
News & World Report, 1 August 1995, 66.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
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and he did so, in part, because he had been on the Ways and
Means Committee and he knew Dan Rostenkowski very well.
Jamieson agrees with Lewis' and Borger's basic premise.
The "Harry and Louise" ads were not necessarily effective as
mass advertising, per se.

If they were then "Harry and

Louise" would have changed public opinion.
that they did not.

Evidence suggests

Instead, Jamieson contends that they were

effective as a public relations phenomenon —
decision making process —

in altering the

primarily because the media

imputed political pull to "Harry and Louise."
On the major networks, the ads received more than fiveand-a-half minutes of free air time, and most of this covered
HIAA's strategy or the ads' political potency, not the
accuracy of the ads or how they contributed to solving the
health care problem.

In the print media, "Harry and Louise"

were mentioned over seven-hundred times in newspaper
articles, and the couple "got more headline space in the
nation's major news papers than the Senate Majority leader or
the Senate Minority

l e a d e r ."20

Jamieson also recognizes that the press responded to how
the administration retorted "Harry and Louise."

Since press

coverage is driven by conflict, attack and counterattack, the
"real press attention" came when
Bill and Hillary Clinton started to attack [Harry
and Louise]. The press gravitated toward the
attack, [and] featured Harry and Louise as an
Great Health Care Debate, videotape.
20 Ibid.
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important enemy of the Clinton plan ... they
assumed because the Clintons were treating [the
couple] as if they were a serious player, they must
be and they must be highly effective. Key
legislators accepted this press interpretation and
acted on it .21
In November, 1993, Hillary Clinton rebutted the HIAA
campaign and the insurance industry in a well publicized
speech.

She began, "I know you've all seen the a d s ---

'There must be a better way' —

you've seen that right?

What

you don't get told in the ad is that it is paid for by
insurance companies ...."22

Newsweek journalist Jonathan Alter

reported that the First Lady's "attack" was substantively
accurate and he stressed the divisions between the First Lady
and the HIAA.

Quoting her, he wrote that the health industry

has "brought us to the brink of bankruptcy," and they enjoy
"being able to exclude people from coverage, because the more
they can exclude, the more money they can

m a k e . "23

As the First Lady positioned herself against the health
insurance industry, a number of media reports fortified the
perception that this was a battle between the White House and
big business.

For instance, one report by "NBC Nightly News

With Tom Brokaw," began with Brokaw's introduction, "Hillary
Rodham Clinton today launched a scathing attack on the health

21 Ibid.
22 Sam Husseini, "Hillary & Bill & Harry & Louise," The
Nation, 13 December 1993, 732.
23 Jonathan Alter, "Go Ahead, Bust Some Chops,"
Newsweek, 15 November 1993, 34.
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insurance industry."24

During the story Washington

correspondent Andrea Mitchell suggested that anonymous
sources were telling her that the White House went after the
HIAA because they "wanted a scapegoat. "25

CNN journalists

also played the HIAA and the White House against one another.
One reporter stated that the administration is "involved in
something close to an all-out war with the health insurance
industry," and that "the White House would rather talk about
insurance industry profits than the rosy assumptions on which
its own plan is based."26
These examples exhibit a couple of interesting points
about the media's coverage of the debate.

The first is that

media content depicting health care reform to be a battle
between the Clintons and the health insurance industry is
misleading.

As noted, the plan was adapted from a managed

competition blueprint drawn up by the "Big Five" health
insurance companies —

Aetna, Cigna, Metropolitan Life,

Prudential and Travelers.

The Clintons were not battling

these members of the health insurance industry.

In fact,

this group had formed the Alliance for Managed Competition,
and continued to back President Clinton's proposal.

However,

most journalists used terms such "the health insurance
industry" freely without recognizing the divisions within the
industry itself.

Thus, the real debate emerged as a battle

24 As cited by Husseini, "Hillary & Bill," 732.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
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between big health insurers and small health insurers, but
many members of the media concentrated on the attack and
counter attack's forged by the Clinton administration and the
equivocal "health insurance industry."27
The second point is that media coverage concentrated on
the attack and counterattack of the competing sides, even
when journalists recognized the split between the larger and
smaller health insurers.

For example, Newsweek's Jonathan

Alter suggests that the political strategy behind Clinton's
approach was to divide and conquer the insurers, "The halfdozen big boys would back the plan because they stand to win
one of the sweetest shared monopolies ever ."28

However, the

members of HIAA, who "wreak havoc on the system with mounds
of paperwork and cherry picking (insuring only healthy people
without 'preexisting conditions') would be driven

o u t . "29

Alter also acknowledges that the HIAA was mistaken to
suggest that "the Clinton plan" would limit a patient's right
to choose a doctor, but he also contends that the "Harry and
Louise" ads were no more "misleading than the average
election-year spot.
were rather

In fact, the industry's opening salvos

mild...."30

However, according to Alter, the

First Lady was "smart to rip their heads off" because if

27
28
29
20

Husseini, "Hillary & Bill," 732
Alter, "Go Ahead," 34.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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health reform is to live, then the members of the HIAA "must
die. "31
The terminology used in these examples is frustrating if
one is concerned about having a frank and open discussion
about the problems of health care in the United States and
possible ways to solve those problems.

Phrases such as —

"a

scathing attack," "wanting a scapegoat," "an all out war,"
"ripping their heads off," and "must die" —
because they are used so freely.

lack context

Unfortunately, they have

also become characteristic of pack journalism, directed by
free market pressures.

Thus news outlets are not only

providing news, they are also providing entertainment.

As

these pressures increase, the line between news and
entertainment becomes increasingly blurred and, ironically,
when sources of entertainment comment on matters of public
policy they contribute to a mediated perception of reality
for both the public and their decision makers.
Anti-reform themes were picked-up by two of CBS's
prime time television programs.

A scene on "Picket Fences"

depicted the show's primary characters, a married couple, in
the kitchen discussing the effects of health care reform on
their family.

The wife explained, "We have two sons who are

very fragile right now —

emotionally, psychologically.

This

is a bad time for their father to get fired, and the Clinton

31 Ibid.
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health plan is going to cut my salary by thirty-percent.

If

we lose your income too...." ^2
Another scene on "Northern Exposure" echoed the antiClinton sentiment but was set against the backdrop of an
Alaskan saloon rather than a family's kitchen.

A man sitting

at the bar, reading a newspaper, bemoans, "Ah, national
health insurance, here we go down the sinkhole of socialized
medicine."

The bartender responds, "Like in England."

"Yeah, and look what wonders its done for them.
an empire down the toilet."

Man:

How to flush

Jamieson suggests that it is not

only difficult to rebut dialogue that is insinuated into
prime time television but that this type of political
commentary hindered the policy making process because it
contributed to the public's negative perception of Clinton's
proposal without offering preferable alternatives.33
Another form of flak that was difficult for the White
House to rebut, and which perpetuated confusion about the
Health Security Act, came from talk radio.34

This relatively

new medium's most popular personality is Rush Limbaugh.

The

"bombastic" talk show host has become so popular and
influential that when the Republicans gained control of
Congress in 1995 they made Limbaugh an honorary member of the
Republican freshman class.

Limbaugh offered them some advice

with editorial space given to him by the Wall Street Journal,

3 2 Great Health Care Debate, videotape.
33 Ibid.
34 Johnson and Broder, The System, 570.
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"Never moderate your tone.... Never attempt to be liked by
those you defeated."35
Limbaugh is considered by some to be one of the most
influential commentators in

A m e r i c a . 36

His daily broadcasts

are on over six-hundred-fifty radio stations and two-hundred
television stations received by an estimated twenty-million
people each week.

He has also appeared as a guest political

commentator on ABC's "Nightline" and "This Week With David
Brinkley;" NBC's "Today Show" and "Meet The Press;"
PBS's "MacNeil /Lehrer News hour."

and

The New York Times, Los

Angeles Times, Newsweek, and the Wall Street Journal have all
published his

c o l u m n s . 37

Despite Limbaugh's bombastic style, these guest spots
have not been token appearances.

In fact, many leading

journalists and politicians have lauded his contributions.
Tim Russert, Washington bureau chief for NBC and host of
"Meet The Press," said of Limbaugh, "You have to give him
credit —

he works hard at getting his facts straight."

William Bennett, former Secretary of Education,

even

described Limbaugh as "possibly our greatest living
American. "38

35 Ibid.
36 Steven Rendall, Jim Naureckas, and Jeff Cohen, The
Wav Things Aren't; Rush Limbaugh's Reign of Error (New York:
The New Press, 1995), 7.
37 Ibid, 7, 10.
38 Ibid., 10.
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However, during the health care debate Limbaugh's
commentary tended to mock the Clinton administration's health
care proposal, and to misrepresent the facts about the plan
and the public's opinion of its essential elements.

In

effect, Limbaugh was a very influential channel for
antagonists of reform.

Evidence of his influence was seen

when the administration organized a bus caravan to tour the
country in support of health care reform, the buses were met
by mobs of boisterous protesters largely organized by Rush
Limbaugh and other conservative talk radio outlets.39
Jamieson has found that those who relied on Rush
Limbaugh as a primary source of news during the debate were
actually the least informed about the basic facts of the
country's health care system.

For example, when asked,

"Which groups (the elderly, poor, middle class, etc.) are
most likely to be uninsured?," they most often responded the
elderly, all of whom are presently insured under Medicare.
Ironically, Limbaugh listeners were also the most likely to
say that they were better informed than other Americans on
health care reform.40
A primary reason that people find it easy to rely on
Rush Limbaugh is that he entertains them.

During the health

care debate he often made fun of the Clintons with humorous
skits, songs and jokes.

An example of this was the "Dr.

Hilldare" skit aired on his radio show.

The skit featured

Great Health Care Debate, videotape.
Al Franken, Rush Limbaugh is a Big Fat Idiot and
Other Observations, (New York; Delacorte Press, 1996), 12.
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two characters that sounded like Bill and Hillary Clinton.
It began with a forewarning from the narrator, "She's a
doctor with a prescription for disaster.... She's Hillary
Clinton ... and she's Dr. Hilldare."
says, "I don't know doctor.

The voice of a patient

I tend to get heartburn after

eating spicy food."

Dr. Hilldare would simply respond,

"Heart transplant."

The narrator would begin again, "Dr.

Hilldare, she specializes in fixing things that aren't really
broken."

A voice sounding like Bill Clinton's responds,

"Prosthetic hand replacement for a hangnail?
I go along with that honey."

I don't know if

Dr. Hilldare threatens, "You

know what happens when you question my judgment Willie."
Clinton's voice:

"Ok, I'll get the scalpel."

The narrator

concludes, "Dr. Hilldare, she wants to overhaul the best
health care system in the free world. "4i
Beyond Rush Limbaugh's entertainment value, his
monologues were often scathing misrepresentations of
President Clinton's health care package:
Virtually no choice will exist for you if the
Clinton plan passes, virtually none. It's full of
things that [are] going to harm freedom. It's
going to harm individuals. It's going to raise
costs
What do [the Clintons], who claim to care
more than anybody else, done in their lives that
gives them the qualifications to orchestrate, to
write and to implement and then carry out such a
massive undertaking.... Forget about the money for
a minute. I'm talking about the lack of
freedom.... You have to get permission from the
government before you can do anything in regard to
health care if this thing happens.42
The Great Health Care Debate, videotape.
42 Ibid.
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Beyond the fact that Limbaugh is misleading —
approach preserved fee-for-service medicine —

Clinton's

his

accusations are effective because he avoided the complex
language of health care debate.

His language can be

understood by anyone and it appeals to "primal fears."43
Most Americans are not going to want a health care system
that restricts freedom, harms individuals, or requires the
patient to get governmental permission.

During the debate.

Democratic Senator Harris Wofford understood how Limbaugh's
accusations appealed to fear, just as Senator Rockefeller had
warned the President frcan the start.

Wofford contends that

Limbaugh's tirades might have prevented a compromise from
being reached because there is a "temptation in what Rush
Limbaugh represents and what a huge amount of people fear;
that the government can't do anything right.

It's fear and

hostility."44
What makes Limbaugh even more effective is that his
audience is basically a captive one.

The twenty-million

people he reaches each week do not hear any other point of
view during his program.

As Jamieson contends, Limbaugh

often makes good points that could be debated by someone who
disagrees with him.

In a debate, the members of the audience

could at least accept or reject Rush Limbaugh's arguments.
In his monologues, one does not get that

o p p o r t u n i t y .45

43 Ibid.
44 Johnson and Broder, The System, 277.
45 The Great Health Care Debate, videotape.
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Unfortunately, the news media often failed to question
Limbaugh's depictions of the White House or the Clinton
health care package when given the chance.

One of these

instances stemmed from the suicide of Vince Foster.
On July 20, 1993, Foster's body was found with a single
bullet wound to the temple in Fort Marcy Park next to the
Potomac River in Virginia.

Notwithstanding the official

conclusions of the investigation, murderous conspiracy
theories became a staple on conservative talk radio.

These

accusations intensified when in December, 1993, the
Washington Times reported that certain files had been removed
from Foster's office on the night of his death.

The files

pertained to the Clintons' involvement in Whitewater, a
private land development in Arkansas that had been the
subject of ethical and criminal investigations since the 1992
campaign.46
On his March 10, 1994 broadcast, Limbaugh urgently
announced, "Ok, folks, I think I got enough information here
to tell you about the contents of this fax that I got.

Brace

yourselves.... [I]t is a bit of news which says ... Vince
Foster was murdered in an apartment owned by Hillary Clinton,
and the body was then taken to Fort Marcy Park (italics
a d d e d ) . "47

Limbaugh had received this information from a

newsletter put out by a Washington D. C. consulting firm.

46 Johnson and Broder, The System, 235, 260-261.
47 Jim Naureckas and Janine Jackson, eds. The Fair
Reader; An Extral Review of Press and Politics in the 90's.
(Boulder, Co.: Westview Press Inc., 1996), 139.
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Not only did the newsletter state that the allegations were a
rumorf but it also stated that Foster had committed suicide
in an apartment owned by White House associates.

It did not

state, as Limbaugh had broadcasted to millions, that Foster
had been murdered in an apartment owned by the First Lady. 48
On April 19, 1994, a special episode of ABC's
"Nightline" focused on the press's coverage of Whitewater.
Appearing as a special guest Limbaugh claimed, "Whitewater is
about health care."
Most people think that health care is a good idea,
but they haven't read the plan. They're taking the
President's word for it. Now I think if the
President's word is what we are going to rely on
for his policies ... and if people are going to
base their support for the plan on whether or not
they can take his word, I think it's fair to
examine whether or not he keeps his word.... [A] 11
of those things [i.e. Whitewater] that people are
curious about are simply a window into whether or
not [the Clintons are] telling falsehoods t o d a y . 49
There is nothing wrong with Limbaugh connecting questions
about health care reform to questions about Clinton's
character.

However, Koppel did not question Limbaugh on why

the relationship really mattered, in policy terms.

How is it

48 Ibid., 140.
49 See Johnson and Broder, The System. 276-277;
Naureckas and Jackson, eds. The Fair Reader, 139-141; and
Theda Skocpol, Boomerang; Clinton's Health Security Effort
and the Turn against Government in U. S. Politics (New York:
W. W, Norton & Company, 1996), 213. It is important to note
that Johnson and Broder treat this quote as if it occured
during one of Limbaugh's radio broadcasts. Naurecks and
Jackson, as well as Skocpol, explicitly state that Limbaugh
made this statement during the interview on "Nightline."
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that "Whitewater is about health care?"50

Does their

suspected involvement in unproven scandals disqualify the
Clintons from being able to "orchestrate, to write and to
implement and then carry out such a massive undertaking?"si
When, on the same show, he was questioned about the
false irumor of Vince Foster's death, Limbaugh claimed that he
is not "a rumor-monger."

The show's host, Ted Koppel did not

question Limbaugh on this point, saying, "As I recall you
didn't present it as accurate, did you?

You represented it

as one of the rumors that was going around."

Producer, Jeff

Greenfield added in another segment that Limbaugh had
"broadcast the rumor as an example of the more wild stories
circulating."52
The benevolent treatment that Limbaugh received from the
news media helped to confuse the public's perception of the
Health Security Act just as much as the press's charitable
coverage of "Harry and Louise."

This begs the question,

asked by PBS's Bill Moyers, "Can we conduct public policy
debates when the average Joe and Jane are confused?"
Jamieson's reply is simply no, and she contends that "the
problem with this level of confusion is that it is very easy
for advertising and for demagoguery to frighten people, and
frighten them needlessly. "53

since most of the public did not

50 Ibid.
51 The Great Health Care Debate, Videotape.
52 Naureckas and Jackson, eds. The Fair Reader, 140.
53 The Great Health Care Debate. Videotape.
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really know what was in the President's plan to start with,
flak only contributed to the public's

c o n f u s i o n . 54

Despite Jamieson's conclusion, flak probably did more
than just create confusion because the public also received a
significant amount of policy information from these same
s o u r c e s . 55

since the press rarely provided an adequate

discussion of policy matters, the opinions of the HIAA, Rush
Limbaugh, and other sources of flak substituted as policy
analysis.

Even though these sources may have filled a "gap"

in news coverage, a thorough, accurate description of health
care reform requires more objective sources than political
advertising or talk radio.
The following chapter, "No Exit: A Chart, A Scandal, and
A Bus Tour," will focus on how the media strayed from policy
analysis, concentrated on the surface aspects of the debate,
and failed to probe or question various reform alternatives.
By not questioning flak and following the rest of the pack,
most journalists did more that just reinforce the idea that
"the Clinton Plan" was an unacceptable alternative.

In the

end, "the media failed in a historic way to help Americans
understand and decide on this issue."56

54 Ibid.
55 Johnson and Broder, The System. 635
56 Ibid., 634,
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CHAPTER 4
NO EXIT:
A CHART, A SCANDAL, AND A BUS TOUR

In 1994, better than sixty-percent of the newspaper
articles on health care reform focused on either political
strategies or public opinion polls rather than policy
matters.1

The previous two chapters have illustrated that

anti-government sentiment and flak exacerbated the news
media's drift away from discussing matters of policy, and
toward covering some of the debate's more superficial
aspects.

This chapter describes how this drift often

manifested into various media feeding frenzies and,
ironically, how pack journalism actually inspired anti-reform
sentiment, and anti-reform flak.
As Larry Sabato explains, a feeding frenzy is a
"political event or circumstance where a critical mass of
journalists leap to cover the same embarrassing or scandalous
subject and pursue it intensely, often excessively, and

1 Tom Hamburger, "Coverage on Health Care Confuses More
Than it Clarifies," Minneapolis Star-Tirbune, 24 October
1994; as cited by James Carville, We're Right, They're Wrong:
A Handbook for Spirited Progressives (New York: Random
House, 1996), 114.
65
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sometimes uncontrollably ."2

in particular, there were four

political situations receiving such attention —

a flow chart

of Clinton's plan published in the Wall Street Journal, the
ongoing news coverage of Whitewater, an article entitled "No
Exit" published in The New Republic, and the Reform Rider bus
caravan in the summer of 1994.

These examples symbolize how

many members of the press became preoccupied with "gauging
and guessing who would win" the debate on Capital Hill and
"not in exploring what the consequences [of health care
reform] would be for the country."3

As Haynes Johnson and

David Broder suggest, this type of reporting is a product of
the journalistic culture, "its professional mind-set and its
commercial, competitive pressures."4
The news media is a business, it relies on standard
sources of information.

These include individuals such as

government officials, academics, and other journalists, as
well as groups such as think tanks, special interest groups,
and other media outlets.

Not only do these sources reduce

investigative costs, but they are also presumptively accurate

2 Larry Sabato, Feeding Frenzy; How Attack Journalism
Has Transformed American Politics. (New York: The Free
Press, 1991) 6.
2 Haynes Johnson and David Broder, The System: The
American Wav of Politics at the Breaking Point (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1996), 635.
4 Ibid., 634.
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and thus provide some protection against critics of media
bias or those who threaten libel suits.5
In October, 1993, Republican Representative Dick Armey
served as an established source of information for the Wall
Street Journal.

They published his opinion-editorial

entitled "Your Future Health Plan," in which Armey claimed
that the Clinton plan would "create 59 new federal
programs ... expand 20 others, impose 79 new federal mandates
and make major changes in the tax code."6

Accompanying his

letter was an extensive flow chart and glossary.

The chart

depicted a vast array of arrows darting between some forty
boxed acronyms, and the glossary briefly described each of
them.

Armey contended, "this flow chart makes it clear that

the Clinton plan is a bureaucratic nightmare that will
ultimately result in higher taxes, reduced efficiency,
restricted choice, longer lines and a much bigger federal
government."?
However, Theda Skocpol notes that a great deal of the
chart illustrated the already existing web of government and
private insurance bureaucracy.

Nonetheless, variations of

the chart "soon appeared on television, inspired cartoonists
and humor columnists, and became a staple of conservative

5 Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturinq
Consent; The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1988), 18-25.
® Dick Armey, "Your Future Health Plan," Wall Street
Journal, 13 October 1993, 22(A).
7 Ibid.
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attacks on the Clinton plan."8

Army's chart was even used by

Senator Bob Dole in the Republican's nationally televised
rebuttal of President Clinton's 1994 State of the Union
Address.9
Essentially, the news media accepted the chart without
questioning its accuracy, and thus gave anti-reform
Republicans an opportunity to accuse Clinton's plan of being
a "bureaucratic nightmare," as Armey had done in his letter
to the Wall Street Journal.

This theme became important

because many Republicans believed that their party could
regain the White House and take control of Congress if they
could demonize the Clinton plan, and then defeat any
compromise devised by congressional Democrats.

This strategy

was adamantly supported by the Project for the Republican
Future and its chair, William Kristol.

In a steady stream of

memorandums to leading Republicans, Kristol argued for "the
unqualified political defeat of the Clinton health care
proposal."10

By January, 1994, Republicans began to follow

Kristol's advice and openly adopt one of his favorite axioms,
"there is no health care crisis."H

®
Effort
York:
9

Theda Skocpol, Boomerang; Clinton's Health Security
and the Turn against Government in U. S. Politics (New
W. W. Norton & Company, 1996), 143-144.
Ibid., 144.
10 Ibid., 145-146.
11 Johnson and Broder, The System, 270.
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In Senator Dole's rebuttal to President Clinton's State
of the Union Address, he pointed to an Armey-esque chart to
support his argument against the Clinton plan:
Our country has health care problems, but not a
health care crisis, but we will have a crisis if we
take the President's medicine — a massive overdose
of government control.,.. More cost, less choice,
more taxes, less quality, more government control
and less control for you and your family — that's
what the President's government-run plan is likely
to give you.... Let me point out some of the new
bureaucracies that the President's plan will
create. Way up here is the National Health Board.
Over here is the Advisory commission on Regional
Variations of Health Expenditures.... Now you and I
are way down here, way at the bottom. I don't know
why we're not at the top, but we're at the bottom. 12
Strewn across the chart were terms such as "taxes,"
"regulation," and "drug-pricing scheme."

As Johnson and

Broder contend, "It was all negative ... all brilliantly
effective.

From then on, the chart became a centerpiece in

Capital Hill debates.

It further frightened a public already

suspicious of government

"13

However, part of the reason the chart gained such
notoriety is that the Republicans used it as an accusatory
tool, and accusations make inherently dramatic media content
that can create fear.

Reporters naturally gravitate toward

these types of conflict and, as Skocpol contends, this
tendency was worsened because major media outlets assigned
higher-profile political reporters to the debate.

Since most

12 "Excerpts From the Republican's Response to the
President's Message," New York Times, 26 January 1994, 15(A).
13 Johnson and Broder, The System. 270.
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of them were policy generalists, they often accentuated who
was arguing with whom, and often failed "to help the public
see the details of proposals or the validity of claims about
them."14

Therefore, just as Armey's letter in

the Wall Street Journal, Senator Dole's rebuttal went
virtually unquestioned by the major media.
Instead, the New York Times, anticipating the 1996
Presidential election, pitted Clinton's proposal against
Dole's leadership.

Its front page headline read, "Clinton

Vows Fight for His Health Plan."is

However, the article

accurately noted that Clinton demanded universal health care,
not necessarily the passage of his plan.

Brandishing his pen

at the members of Congress, the President stated, "If you do
send me legislation that does not guarantee every American
private health insurance that can never be taken away, you
will force me to take this pen, veto the legislation, and
we'll come right back here and start all over."is

The Wall

Street Journal also veered away from an analysis of Clinton's
proposal or questioning Dole's accusations, noting that, "The
President's threat to veto anything less than universal
health coverage is a politically risky move ... [and] the

Skocpol, Boomerang. 128.
15 Gwen Ifill, "Clinton Vows Fight for His Health Plan,"
New York Times, 26 January 1994, 1(A).
15 Ibid.
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statement will thrill the left wing of the Democratic
Party___
In describing the Republican response to Clinton's
speech, the inner pages of the Times read, "Gone, at least
for tonight, was the legislative Senator Dole, who often
seeks compromise.

Instead he was the combative, partisan

leader ... sounding an electoral trumpet for November...." is
The article did not probe Dole's accusations —

that

Clinton's plan would cost more, provide less choice, increase
taxes, lower quality, and give the government more "control."
When the leading news agencies accepted his claims without
question it created a wake of anti-reform themes throughout
the mass media.
Notions about the "bureaucratic nightmare" even landed
in the pages of the "world's most widely read magazine,"
Reader's Digest. I t ' s

March, 1994, cover read "YOUR RISK IN

CLINTON'S HEALTH PLAN."20

The article began with a story

about Donald Porter, a sixty-four-year-old Canadian who
needed an expensive bone marrow transplant to treat his
lymphatic cancer.

However, "the government deemed him 'too

old' for a transplant; younger people had a better chance of
Jeffrey H. Birnbaum and Michael K. Frisby, "Clinton
Pledges That Crime and Welfare Issues Will Get Near-Equal
Billing with Health Care," Wall Street Journal, 26 January
1994, 16(A).
Adam Clymer, "In G.O.P. Response to Clinton, Dole
Denies There is a 'Crisis' in Health Care," New York Times,
26 January 1994, 15(A).
19 Skocpol, Boomerang. 148.
20 Reader's Digest. March 1994.
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s u r v i v a l . "21

so Porter decided to sell his house, take out

all of his savings and come to the United States for the
operation.

Now his cancer is in remission.

When the

Canadian system failed him. Porter came to the United States,
the one industrialized country that does not have universal
medical coverage but, according to Reader's Digest, the one
that does have the highest standard of health care in the
world.22
Even though human interest stories can be effective in
explaining difficult policies to the public, the Reader's
Digest story was more likely to misinform.

Since the United

States ranks in the lower tier of industrialized nations in
life expectancy and infant mortality rate, it may not
necessarily be true that the country has the highest standard
of health care in the

w o r l d . 23

Moreover, the article was

about the ills of a Canadian-style, single-payer health care
system.

It neither mentioned that Clinton had rejected this

approach, nor clarified that the Health Security Act was a
managed care proposal-

Instead, the article featured large

print abstracts that could have come straight from Armey's
letter, from Kristol's strategy memos, from Dole's response
to the President's State of the Union address, or even from
Rush Limbaugh or the HIAA:
21 Ralph Kinney Bennet, "Your Risk Under Clinton's
Health Plan," Reader's Digest, March 1994, 127.
22 Ibid.
23Steven Rendall, Jim Naureckas, and Jeff Cohen, The Wav
Things Aren't; Rush Limbaugh's Reign of Error (New York:
The New Press, 1995), 120.
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Rhetoric to the contrary, the Clintons must know
this plan will result in rationing.
The plan would actually increase costs and tax many
jobs and businesses out of existence.
Quality will be a forgotten concept.
They are taking away our choice of doctor.24
The vernacular of these accusations is most striking —
"ration," "tax," "quality," "choice."

The former two are

inherently negative and appeal to anti-government sentiment,
while the latter are terms Clinton had used positively which
adversaries turned against him.

Moreover, these accusations

were easily connected to questions about the character of
Clinton, his administration, the First Lady, and how little
the public trusted them.
Given the intricate nature of the President's proposal,
support for his plan would have to be based on the public's
belief in his word.

As explained by Rush Limbaugh, "if the

President's word is what we are going to rely on for his
policies ... it's fair to examine whether or not he keeps his
word

"25

For many members of the public, the media's

intense focus on Whitewater (a late 1970's land deal in which
the President and First Lady were involved), and other

24 Bennet, "Your Risk Under Clinton's Health Plan," 128131.
25 See Johnson and Broder, The System, 276-277; Jim
Naureckas and Janine Jackson, eds. The Fair Reader; An
Extra! Review of Press and Politics in the 9 0 's. (Boulder,
Co.: Westview Press Inc., 1996), 139.; and Skocpol,
Boomerang, 213.
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seemingly connected scandals gave them an answer —

no, the

Clintons cannot be trusted.
On the night of December 19, 1993, CNN broadcast
portions of an article entitled, "Living with the Clintons:
Bill's Arkansas Bodyguards Tell the Story the Press Missed,"
to be published in the American Spectator.

The article

presented the claims of two former Arkansas State Troopers
that Clinton had numerous extramarital affairs while serving
as Governor of Arkansas.26

Two days later, the front-page of

the Los Angeles Times read, "Troopers Say Clinton Sought
Silence on Personal Affairs."

The troopers described "a

pattern of deception and indiscretions," and claimed that
"Clinton, as president, sought to discourage them from
speaking out by offering them federal jobs."27

These

allegations were never proven, but it mattered little because
"Troopergate" had been born.

The media's attention to the

troopers' accusations also refocused the press's attention on
the Clintons' doings in Arkansas, especially their
involvement in Whitewater.28
The Clintons, along with their friends from Arkansas,
Jim and Susan McDougal# purchased two-hundred-and-thirty
acres on the White River in Arkansas.

After Clinton was

elected Governor in 1979, the Whitewater Development

26 Johnson and Broder, The System, 255-256.
27 william C. Rempel and Douglas Prentz, "Troopers Say
Clinton Sought Silence on Personal Affairs," Los Angeles
Times, 21 December 1993, 1(A).
28 Johnson and Broder, The System, 256.
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Corporation was formed, incorporating the tract purchased
with the McDougals.

In 1982, McDougal acquired Woodruff

Savings and Loan, changing its name to Madison Guarantee.
Two years later, the Federal Home and Loan Bank Board issued
a report on Madison stating that, "Substantial profits from
the service corporation on the sale of real estate owned have
been improperly recognized ... as a result of contract sales
and submarket interest rates.

Correcting entries will

adversely affect net worth and result in an insolvent
position."29
In 1985, the Rose Law Firm, where Hillary Clinton was a
partner, represented Madison before the Arkansas Security
Department, concerning their restructuring plan.

That same

spring, McDougal held a fund raiser to help pay Governor
Clinton's 1984 campaign debt.

Later, questions arose as to

whether these funds were illegally diverted from Madison to
the Clinton campaign.

In 1989, Madison was closed by federal

regulators, with an estimated loss of sixty-million dollars,
and the McDougals were indicted on charges of bank

fraud.30

Although most of this was known during the campaign,
Whitewater was on the media's back burner during President
Clinton's first year in office.

Members of the press were

busy reporting on "Travelgate," "Troopergate," and various
other peccadilloes.

So by the end of 1993 the press's

disposition to interpret any hint of wrongdoing into full-

29 Johnson and Broder, The System, 259.
30 Ibid.
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fledged scandal had increased.

In addition, Johnson and

Broder point out that, since Watergate, Americans have become
"conditioned to expect the worst from public officials.—
This preconception only worsens the effects of scandal-driven
press coverage, and it became only a matter of time before
Whitewater regained the media spotlight.
One week prior to the State of the Union Address, the
headline of the Washington Post's "National Weekly Edition"
read "WHITEWATER:

More Questions Than

A n s w e r s . "32

Below the

banner was a picture of a waving, jovial Bill and Hillary
Clinton, superimposed over headlines from other leading
newspapers (the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, the
New York Times).

Strewn across the page, the scathing

headlines surrounded the Clinton's photo, symbolizing a media
siege —

"Ever-Growing Paper Trail:

Whitewater Records Go

from Nothing to Volumes," "On Arkansas, Sex, Not Inhaling,
and Whitewater," "A Special Council for Whitewater."33
Whitewater feeding frenzy was everywhere:
It seeped into conversations, leaped out in daily
headlines, blared form television sets, boomed on
radio talk show commentary, and became the subject
of increasingly venomous conspiracy theories —
about Vince Foster, the Clintons, the Rose Law
Firm.... In one week in mid-March, at the peak of
the press frenzy, the nation's seven largest
newspapers published ninety-two Whitewater stories.
During that one month, the three TV networks aired
one hundred twenty-six Whitewater stories. By
comparison, from the first of the year to the end
Johnson and Broder, The System, 262
32 Ibid., 263.
33 Ibid.
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of March, the three networks aired one hundred
seven stories on Bosnia, fifty-six on the Middle
East, and forty-two on the health care debate.
More Whitewater newspaper stories were published in
major papers than on the combined total of health
care, welfare, and crime legislation.34
Therefore, media messages about Whitewater, health care
reform, and all the President's troubles became increasingly
intermingled.

Representative Jim McDermott ccmipared them,

especially Whitewater, to a smog hanging over the President's
health care proposal, "At first you don't see it, then you
do.

It's subliminal.

noticing it."35

It saps your energy ... you can't help

Part of the smog was created by excessive

negative media coverage, and that made it much easier for
Kristol, Armey, Dole and many others to say "there is no
health care crisis," while the press failed to question their
claims.

Over time, media content increasingly portrayed both

the President and his health proposal to be fraudulent.
However, when the newly elected Speaker of the House,
Newt Gingrich, reflected on the health care battle he pointed
to another important episode which decided the fate of the
President's proposal.

It was an influential article that

appeared in the February 7, 1994, edition of The New
Republic, entitled "No Exit," by Elizabeth McCaughey.
Gingrich said it was "the first decisive break point ... They
never recovered from her

a n a l y s i s . "36

At the time of the

34 Ibid., 275.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., 272.
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article, McCaughey was a virtually unknown intellectual at
the conservative Manhattan Institute.3?

According to James

Fallows, the predominant view in Washington was that
McCaughey, "with no ax to grind and no preconceptions about
health care, sat down for a careful reading of the whole
Clinton bill," and after discovering its true consequences,
"she felt it her duty to warn people about what the bill
might mean."38
The article began, "If you're not worried about the
Clinton health bill, keep reading ... you will have to settle
for one of the low-budget health plans selected by the
government.

The law will prevent you from going outside the

system to buy basic health coverage you think is better—

."39

After each of her accusations, McCaughey cited page numbers
of the bill, so anyone doubting her claims could look it up.
However, most of the press did not question her accusations.
Instead, her contention that the Clinton plan would adversely
effect the quality of American's health care and hazardously
transform one-seventh of the national economy was
perpetuated.40
McCaughey's claims were sustained by reactions from
other members of the mass media.

For example, Michael

37 See James Fallows, "A Triumph of Misinformation,"
Atlantic Monthly, 275 nl (January 1995): 32; Johnson and
Broder, The System, 272; and Skocpol, Boomerang, 153.
38 Fallows, "A Triumph of Misinformation," 36.
39 Elizabeth McCaughey, "No Exit: What the Clinton plan
will do for you," The New Republic. 7 February 1994, 21.
48 Fallows, "A Triumph of Misinformation," 36.
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Kinsley, one of the nations leading left wing political
commentators, referred to McCaughey as a "nightmare
scenarist."

At the seone time, he contended that health care

reform is "a test of our capacity as a democracy to have an
honest and sophisticated debate over an important public
i s s u e . "41

Yet Kinsley's rebuttal was not a part of the very

debate for which he called.

He not only resorted to name

calling, he also admitted to not having read the President's
plan, giving credence to McCaughey's opening salvo, "If
you're not worried about the Clinton health bill, keep
reading...."42
Increasing the acceptability of McCaughey's claims were
references to her analysis made by other media outlets such
as the Wall Street Journal and Reader's Digest.

Significant

excerpts were also used by Newsweek's George Will.

In a

February editorial. Will opined, "it would be illegal for
doctors to accept money directly from patients, and there
would be 15-year jail terms for people driven to bribery for
care they feel they need but the government does not deem
n e c e s s a r y . "43

He backed his claims by citing McCaughey, "To

see why support for the plan plummets as analysis of it

Michael Kinsley, "TRB From Washington: Second
Opinion," The New Republic, 14 February 1994, 44.
42 McCaughey, "No Exit," 21.
43 George Will, "The Clintons' Lethal Paternalism,"
Newsweek, 7 February 1994, 64.
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proceeds, see the analysis in The New Republic by Elizabeth
McCaughey of the Manhattan

I n s t i t u t e . . . . "44

Claims such as these were simply false.

The first

provision of the President's proposal stated:
Nothing in this Act Shall be construed as
prohibiting the following;
(1) An individual from purchasing any health care
services.45
This was made clear when the Administration issued a full
rebuttal to "No Exit."

A copy was submitted to The New

Republic but it was never published.
publish another scathing piece by

Instead, they opted to

M c C a u g h e y . 46

McCaughey's contentions that the government would police
the public's health care, and that one-seventh of the economy
was going to be controlled by the federal bureaucracy, became
the conventional wisdcan.

In reality, people were not going

to lose choice, nor would there be a significant economic
shakeup.

In fact, more than forty-percent of health care in

America is already financed by the federal government.

Under

the Health Security Act, the other sixty-percent would
continue to filter through most of the existing corporate
bureaucracy it goes through

n o w . 47

Ironically, McCaughey wound up not being the impartial
voice she claimed to be.

The same year her article was

44 Ibid.
45 Fallows, "A Triumph of M i s i n f o m a t i o n , " 32.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
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published, she became the Republican nominee for Lieutenant
Governor of New York, a race she later won.

Evidently, "No

Exit" gave McCaughey a springboard to her own political
aspirations.48

This development, and her connection to the

Manhattan Institute, leads Johnson and Broder to contend that
McCaughey is a policy advocate, not a journalist.

Thus, any

suggestion that her article contributed to media content is
misguided. 49
However, Johnson and Broder are overlooking an important
factor.

During the debate individuals such as Kinsley and

Will, and news organizations such as The New Republic, the
Wall Street Journal, and Reader's Digest, treated McCaughey
as an accurate source.

Therefore, the overall perception was

that her accusations were precise.

In effect, "No Exit" not

only became a significant part of media content, it also fed
the media's feeding frenzy.

To dismiss McCaughey as "not a

journalist" misses the point.

The press's reaction to "No

Exit" exhibited how press coverage can be driven by
journalism's shortcomings.

As Johnson and Broder themselves

conclude;
The journalistic culture ... nudges the coverage
strongly to emphasize conflict and dissent rather
than clarification of alternatives and the search
for consensus ... [during the debate] the press
focus shifted from explanation of the problem and
the proposed solutions to an emphasis on what might
be called the mugging of the Clinton Plan ... the
press was caught up quickly in gauging and guessing
See Fallows, "A Triumph of Misinformation," 32? Johnson
and Broder, The System, 271-272; and Skocpol, Boomerang, 153.
49 Johnson and Broder, The Svstem. 634.
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who would win, not in exploring what the
consequences would be for the country.so
By the summer of 1994, the press's feeding frenzy had
peaked.

At the same time the Administration decided to mount

a public relations campaign with a bus tour across the
country, tabbed the "Health Security Express."

It was

intended to take the positive message of health care reform
to the people, and hopefully gain positive press coverage
The plan backfired, badly, and a pack of journalists were
there to report about it.

At each stop the buses were met by

fierce protesters, often outnumbering the supporters and
waving signs with various anti-reform and anti-Clinton
slogans, such as "Do you enjoy the compassion of the I.R.S.
and the service of the Post Office ... if so, you'll love
Government-Run Health Care!" si
The protesters fueled negative news coverage more than
the positive intentions of the tour, and their presence was
no coincidence.

Newt Ginrich's Capital Hill office worked

with other Senators and with special interests groups, such
as the National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB)
and Citizens for a Sound Economy (CSE), to derail the bus
caravan.

They obtained the tour's schedule and through the

50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., 460, 465.
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use of talk radio and local contacts they organized
opposition to the President's plan.52
Essentiallyf the rallies became a battle to win media
coverage.

The NFIB organized small business owners to be

available to the media at every stop, providing "real-life
opinions."

Likewise the CSE mailed out "scripts" to local

talk radio programs along the route, urging listeners to
demonstrate against the "Phony Express," calling it a "media
stunt pushing government-controlled health

c a r e . "53

All of this created exciting and politically combative
news stories.

Only two days into the tour the caravan began

rescheduling stops.

As reported in the Washington Post, they

"were so concerned about protesters in Boise [Idaho] that
they canceled their appearance at the planned health care
rally on the steps of the state capitol."54

Three days later,

as they pulled in to the Holiday Inn in North Platte,
Nebraska, they were met by staunch protesters, one
proclaiming, "Bill and Hillary are immoral homosexual

^2 See The Great Health Care Debate, part of The Moyers
Collection, (Princeton; Films for the Humanities and
Sciences, 1994). videotape, and Johnson and Broder, The
Svstem, 466.
53 Johnson and Broder, The Svstem, 467, It is also
important to note; Johnson and Broder explain that CSE is
"backed financially by Richard Mellon Scaife, an heir to the
Pennsylvania Mellon bank and oil fortune ... (he also funds
with] grants and gifts totaling $400,000 a week ... the
Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute and the American
Spectator magazine, a leading force in pushing the
Whitewater/Vince Foster conspiracy theories," (p. 465)
54 Ibid., 463.
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communists.

I don't want them running health care."ss

That

night CBS anchor Connie Chung reported, "The administration's
bus caravan for health care kept on trucking today ... but
the engines are groaning and flak is getting heavier with
every step."56
What the press was not reporting was how nurses on the
tour were busy collecting letters form constituents urging
their representatives to support health care reform.

Nor

were reporters concerned about telling the stories of the
"reform riders," who were mostly private citizens, and why
they had joined the First Lady's crusade.

However, there was

not much room for stories such as these during the summer of
1994.

The national media was focusing on other matters :

an

abortion clinic shooting in Pensacola, Florida, the
horrifying scenes of people starving in Rawanda, the ethnic
war in the former Yugoslavia, and primarily on the Simpson
murder case.57

The compassionate, although political,

intentions of the "Health Security Express" offered no news
in a summer devoted to covering a football star, a murder,
and a car chase.
Overall, the media's coverage of the political debate
over President Clinton's Health Security Act raises serious
questions as to whether American society can have an open,
honest, democratic public policy debate.

In fact, the debate

55 Ibid., 464.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., 471-472.
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engenders pessimism in someone like Dr. Reed Tuckson, one of
the medical experts who offered advice to the Clinton
planners.

As head of the Martin Luther King Jr./Charles Drew

Medical Center in the Watts section of South Central Los
Angeles, Dr. Tuckson knows from first hand experience the
struggle health providers can have.

When he reflected on the

debate he wondered:
how America will ever have the maturity to address
complex issues of public policy given the
manipulation that is possible, given the talk show
mentalities that are so filled with cynicism and
pessimism and can^t-do, and with two-second sound
bites on news that pass for transmission of
information ... it is very possible that America
does not have the ability, the capacity, the
competence, to come together as a unified nation of
people who are able and willing to tackle complex
problems and work through a logical sequence of
solutions.58
Tuckson recognizes that the health care debate lacked
forthrightness, that it often failed to be representative of
most opinions, and that it was often truncated by news
coverage.

Much of this occurred because media content was

formed by an interplay of influences.

Anti-government themes

and flak exacerbated a media feeding frenzy —

their drift

away from discussing matters of policy, and toward covering
the debate's more superficial aspects.
However, others might disagree with this point of view.
For instance, Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky would most
likely contend that the truncation of public debate was a
product of functional control.
58 Ibid.,

The policymaking process is

540, 542.
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dominated by a powerful elite, who used the media to guide
the public against a government takeover of the health care
industry.

On the other hand, Larry Sabato would most likely

contend that the truncation of public debate was the result
of a feeding frenzy, and was not representative of day-to-day
news coverage.

Members of the press perceived Clinton to be

a flawed president, who was proposing a flawed health care
plan, thus journalists went for the jugular at every
opportunity.
The concluding chapter, "The Anti-Democratic Effects of
America's Media," suggests that both of these approaches do
not completely explain what happened to President Clinton's
proposal, or how the health care debate was anti-democratic.
Instead of being a matter of functional control or the result
of a feeding frenzy, press coverage of the debate exhibited
the functional complexity of America's market-based mass
media, which hampers the press's ability to define policy
options and, therefore, truncates debate.

This inability

grows out of the media's reliance on established interests,
trivial points, and conventional wisdom, and manifests into a
feeding frenzy.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION:
THE ANTI-DEMOCRATIC EFFECTS OF AMERICA'S MEDIA

This analysis began by making three contentions.

First,

America's media has an ill-effect on the democratic process,
but scholarly opinions diverge as to how those effects play
out.

The subsequent chapters shed light on this question by

focusing on the relevant influences contributing to media
content during the health care debate, and illustrating how
content was saturated by anti-government themes, swayed by
anti-reform propaganda, and ultimately propelled by a feeding
frenzy.
Second, democracy is more than the semblance of
competing ideas ratified by limited public choice, and
America's press actually have a societal role in
strengthening healthy democratic participation.

A democratic

press empowers people "to assert meaningful control over the
political process by providing them with the information
needed for the intelligent discharge of political
responsibilities."i.

^ Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing
Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1988), 298.
87
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Third, the media's coverage of the health care debate
illustrates how the media often fail to empower the American
citizenry with the necessary information to play a meaningful
role in managing governmental policy.

Instead, the media

often truncated the health care debate, failing to support a
more substantive democratic process.

Indeed, much of what

passed as "debate" was either misinformation or trivial
information, which lacked context and represented only the
surface aspects or thin veneer of democracy.
The media were by no means legally required to cover the
health care debate in a democratic fashion, and the anti
democratic effect of media content does not necessarily
entail that journalists are failing to rely on an equal
distribution of information sources.

However, the media can

have an anti-democratic effect when the information they
provide is primarily sensational and trivial detail.

This

type of information is often unnecessary or counterproductive
because it can be either false or irrelevant.
Herman and Chomsky's thesis is built on the contention
that misinformation is a primary element employed by elites
to manufacture the public's consent to their agenda .2

On the

other hand, Sabato stresses the prevalence of disinformation
created by media feeding frenzies, which often trivializes
political discourse.

The press's continuous hunt for

political scandal monopolizes a substantial amount of media
resources to "the insignificant gaffe rather than to issues

2 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 2.
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of profound national and global impact; on many occasions,
titillation has replaced transportation on the country's
agenda, sex has substituted for serious d e b a t e . . . . i n
other words, irrelevance has replaced relevance.
The combination of misinformation and disinformation in
media content clouds the facts necessary for a populace to
contribute to their democratic processes.

If democracy is

going to function with any meaning, then the media should
focus on policy issues over political bickering, and attempt
to portray the world accurately, not just the world according
to the HIAA, Rush Limbaugh, or a handful of select reporters.
When media content is overly dependent on those who have a
vested interest in the status quo, and it becomes saturated
with their interpretations, its effect can be anti
democratic .
During the health care debate, the overall effect of
these factors is suggested by the Wall Street Journal-NBC
News poll finding that forty-five percent of the population
opposed President Clinton's Health Care Security Act, but
that seventy-six percent favored an unlabeled plan which
contained all the essential elements of Clinton's proposal.4
Since many established interests were combative toward "the
Clinton Plan," the conventional wisdom was that the
population agreed and media content reflected this.
3 Larry Sabato, Feeding Frenzy; How Attack Journalism
Has Transformed American Politics, (New York: The Free
Press, 1991) 209.
4 Hilary Stout, "Many Don't Realize It's the Clinton Plan
They Like," Wall Street Journal. 10 March 1994, 1(B) and 6(B).
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Herman and Chomsky would likely claim that this type of
anti-democratic effect is a function of elite propaganda, "to
inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of
behavior that will integrate them into the institutional
structures of the larger society."5

On the other hand, Sabato

would likely claim that the press's attention to political
bantering —
—

such as that between the HIAA and the Clintons

guaranteed that even the passive observer would find out

about the controversy of the day.

Therefore, the press not

only played a part in setting the country's political agenda,
their coverage also engendered public cynicism about the
entire political process, and "the Clinton Plan."6
Whether one agrees with Herman and Chomsky, that media
content indoctrinates the public to established norms; or
with Sabato, that the media tend to fortify cynicism by
highlighting daily controversies; the effect of either deters
democracy.

However, the media's anti-democratic effect can

be worsened when media content lacks context, and Sabato's
analysis of feeding frenzies clearly recognizes this.

When

coverage is superficial, reports about specific events can
lack meaning and omit the circumstances in which events
occurred.
The lack of contextual substance in the media's coverage
of the health care debate was riddled by terms such as
"liberal," "socialized medicine," and "the Clinton Plan."
5 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 1.
® Sabato, Feeding Frenzy. 206-207.
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These terms often lacked accurate definitions, and each
gained political force from its repeated use.

As the public

hears these terms over and over again, it can only decipher
the language by relying on their own preconceived notions,
and how the press frames the terminology, by way of the
reporter's tone and the report's setting.
The term "Clinton Plan" is the best example of how the
context of the debate deterred democratic decision making.
As negative connotations were attached to the president's
proposal, the phrase "Clinton Plan" was fused into what
George Orwell called "Newspeak," which functions "not so much
to express meanings as to destroy them."?

Perhaps Orwell

foretold the future when he opined that the language of
political discourse will become "ugly and inaccurate because
our thoughts are foolish, but the slovenliness of our
language makes it easier for us to have foolish thoughts."8
The following subsections concentrate on the media's
anti-democratic effects on the health care debate.

Each

section illustrates how established interests, misinformation
and the trivial context of media content, constituted the
majority of this effect.

^ Jeff Cohen and Norman Solomon, Through The Media
Looking Glass; Decoding Bias and Blather in the News
(Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995), 250.
8 Ibid., 252.
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The Liberal Myth
It was argued that media coverage of the health care
debate was plagued by anti-government themes and the liberal
myth.

The media depicted the President's plan as a "liberal,

bi g -govemment approach to health care reform. "9

Members of

the media often relied on these themes instead of probing or
discussing the plan or some of its suggested alternatives.
In effect, this did little to enhance public understanding of
what was at stake, and how the country's health care problems
might be solved.
Established interests played a significant role in
promoting the liberal myth.

The most blatant offense was

that at least one television ad supporting a single-payer
system, paid for by the interest group Neighbor to Neighbor,
was kept off the air.

The ads never "saw the light of day"

because insurance agencies are major

a d v e r t i s e r s .lo

Members

of the insurance industry have the ability to put economic
and legal pressure on stations not to air ads contrary to the
industry's interests.

Thus, members of the status quo have

greater access to the airwaves than do their less powerful
counterparts.n

9 Theda Skocpol, Boomerang: Clinton's Health Security
Effort and the Turn Against Government in U. S. Politics (New
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996), 15.
The Great Health Care Debate, part of The Moyers
Collection, (Princeton: Films for the Humanities and
Sciences, 1994). videotape.
Ibid.
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Not allowing a single-payer advertisement on the public
airwaves narrowed mass media content to a few ads supporting
Clinton's proposal and a great number opposing i t .12

At the

same time, news media content fundamentally nullified the
single-payer option.

ABC's "Nightline" made reference to the

option only twice during a seventeen month period.

One of

those instances was in an interview with President Clinton.
Anchor Ted Koppel suggested to the President that Canadians
were dissatisfied with their single-payer system, when
actually polls showed that only two percent of Canadians
preferred the American health care system to their own.i3
Since the media concentrated on "the Clinton Plan," they
lost sight of ccmpeting alternatives.

In fact, Koppel could

have noted that eighty-nine House Democrats had signed on to
a single-payer bill sponsored by Representative McDermott,
long before the President had made his

proposal.

in effect,

the media's honing in on "the Clinton Plan" limited the
public's choice of policy options to the "liberal Clinton
Plan," or no plan at all.
Another fictitious element of the liberal myth was that
Clinton's proposal was developed under a shroud of secrecy.
In actuality, members of the Health Care Task Force,
12 Ibid.
12 Nightline," March 1, 1994 as cited by Jim Naureckas
and Janine Jackson, eds. The Fair Reader: An ExtraI Review
of Press and Politics in the 9 0 's (Boulder, Co.: Westview
Press Inc., 1996), 169.
14 Haynes Johnson and David Broder, The System: The
American Wav of Politics at the Breaking Point (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1996), 43.
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including Hillary Clinton, wanted to ensure that they could
have free discussion, airing all possible solutions, without
any press leaks or mis interpretations before the plan was
complete.

Very little about the task force was secret.

By

May, 1993 they had already met with 572 organizations, and
when Hillary Clinton publicly testified before Congress, "not
a single legislator complained about the 'closed' or
'secretive' deliberations...."is

However, many journalists,

such as Johnson and Broder, continue to claim that the
secrecy policy was a mistake that "ultimately deprived the
public of essential information on which to form judgments."
Fallows counters that not allowing the press to be part
of the task force's deliberations may have been a bad idea,
but it is debatable that, in these early stages of the
debate, this actually caused a void in public information.
To the extent that there was a void, it was filled by a
greater offense —

the press's inaccurate depiction of the

task force being a secret collection of liberal elites
developing a scheme to take over health care.is
The shroud of secrecy mixed well with the conventional
wisdom equating the President's plan to reform health care to
being a liberal plan.

It also seems that many in the public

lacked a clear conception of his proposal outside the
negative connotations evoked by the very buzzwords, "Clinton

James Fallows, "A Triumph of Misinformation," Atlantic
Monthly, 275 nl (January 1995): 28.
16 Ibid., 29.
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Plan."

Evidence suggests that the media exacerbated the

public's misunderstandings by not mentioning that "Clinton's
health care program would have established the least statist,
most market-^oriented system of universal health insurance to
be found among the industrialized democracies."i?

Anti-Reform Flak
Anti-reform opponents used flak to play on the public's
fear of a governmental takeover of health care.

To a great

extent, media coverage was driven by some of the more
prominent propaganda campaigns and accusations made by
popular talk radio.

Effectively, the media reinforced their

claims instead of questioning them, and media content
amplified the anti-democratic effects of these voices.
Charles Lewis, of the Center for Public Integrity,
suggests that during the health care debate the comparative
advantage enjoyed by some interests was not conducive to
democracy:
We have this facade, or this illusion of democracy.
We have the suggestion that everyone has been
consulted and that there was a great debate. When
in fact there wasn't, and I think that is dishonest
and that its unethical, in a general sense, in
terms of our society.... What is so insidious about
this is that folks can use the tools that are
available to them in our open society to distort a
democracy or manipulate it to their own ends and
that is something we have always cherished the
right to do, and folks are more adept at doing it

Michael Lind, Up From Conservatism; Why the Right is
Wrong for America, (New York: The Free Press, 1996), 263.
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today between technology and money then they've
ever done in the past....
The illusion of there being a great health care debate
was often captured by news coverage.

In one instance news

anchor Margaret Warner, of PBS's "MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour,"
suggested that "interest groups on all sides of the issue
have taken to the a i r w a v e s . I n reality, there were far
more ads discounting "the Clinton Plan" than supporting it .20
The strength of one of the more prominent television
campaigns, the HIAA's "Harry and Louise" ads, was reinforced
by the media crediting the couple with accuracy and
effectiveness.

However, Jamieson suggests that "Harry and

Louise" were only effective as a public relations phenomenon.
The HIAA advertised to get on the agenda of the national
media, targeting areas such as New York, Washington and Los
Angeles.

At the same time they targeted the congressional

districts of members acting on the bill in committee .21
Their two prong approach was intended to influence the
decision making process, to convince Congress to stop "the
Clinton Plan," not necessarily to change public opinion.

The Great Health Care Debate, videotape.
1® Jeff Cohen and Norman Solomon, Through The Media
Looking Glass; Decoding Bias and Blather in the News
(Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995), 86.
20 The Great Health Care Debate, videotape.
21 Darell M. West, Diane Heith and Chris Goodwin, "Harry and
Louise Go to Washington: Political Advertising and Health Care
Reform," Journal of Health, Politics, Policy and Law, (Spring
1996); 43, and The Great Health Care Debate, videotape.
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For the most part, the media's extensive coverage of
"Harry and Louise" validated the campaign's magnitude but, in
another sense the content of the coverage was even more anti
democratic.

The press focused on how the ads jeopardized the

President's effort, but did not focus on their accuracy, or
on how they might contribute to solving the pressing
p r o b l e m . 22

By highlighting how "Harry and Louise" smeared the

President's proposal, and not on the ads' contribution to the
policy debate, the press trivialized the process.
At the same time, the press often conveyed that "Harry
and Louise" represented the views of the "health insurance
industry."

Thus, media content inaccurately depicted a

political battle between the Clintons and the "health
insurance industry."

In actuality, the battle was between

the larger insurers, who had mapped out the President's
proposal, and the smaller ones, represented by the HIAA.
Referring to Clinton's opposition as the "health insurance
industry" contributed to the debate's narrow vernacular.

It

is perhaps not an exaggeration to suggest that much of the
public was left assuming that "the Clinton Plan" was a
"socialist scheme" cooked up by the "government" to take over
one of the country's most important enterprises —

the

"health insurance industry."
Exaggeration or not, this could almost be taken verbatim
from the rhetoric used by Rush Limbaugh.

Standing alone, his

rampages against "the Clinton Plan" were nonconducive to
22 Ibid.
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democracy because his audience is captive.

Limbaugh often

makes strong contentions and, in a debate, the members of the
audience could at least accept or reject his arguments.
However, in his monologues, one rarely gets that
opportunity.23
Moreover, the press often failed to question Limbaugh's
false accusations —

in particular his claim that the

Clintons were involved in covering up Vince Foster's death,
and, more generally, his spreading false rumors such as
"virtually no choice will exist for you if the Clinton plan
passes

"24

Indeed, the staff of ABC's "Nightline" seemed to verify
his false claims.

When Limbaugh implied that questions

surrounding Whitewater, Vince Foster's death and other
supposed scandals should offer a window into whether or not
people can trust the President and his health care proposal,
anchor Ted Koppel accepted Limbaugh's analysis without
question.25

similar ccanpliance was shown when the program's

producer, Jeff Greenfield, suggested that Limbaugh had
"broadcast the rumor [about Vince Foster's death] as an
example of the more wild stories circulating,"26

even though

Limbaugh was greatly responsible for starting the rumor.

23 The Great Health Care Debate, videotape.
24 Ibid.
25 Jim Naureckas and Janine Jackson, eds. The Fair
Reader; An Extrai Review of Press and Politics in the 90's ,
(Boulder, Co.: Westview Press Inc., 1996), 139-141.
26 Ibid., 140.
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Since the members of the press accepted the false claims
of Rush Limbaugh and the HIAA, media content exacerbated
their fear tactics, and anti-democratic effects.

Allowing

these opinions to seep into media content without being
questioned undermined the public's comprehension of events.
If the press shrouds information with the misinformation of a
few prominent actors, and focuses on trivial political
bantering instead of matters of policy, they are failing to
fulfill their societal role.

Feeding Frenzy

Anti-government sentiment and flak lead to a feeding
frenzy.

Media content highlighted the surface aspects of the

debate at the expense of discussing more important policy
matters.

Consequently, press coverage tended to reaffirm

both anti-reform sentiment and anti-reform flak.

The former

was fortified by the media's attempts to be objective.

As

Lindbloom and Woodhouse suggest, such attempts tend to
reinforce "conventional interpretations of current events."27
Since the American public is skeptical about government
intervention and control it was logical for the media to
portray the President's proposal as a government takeover of
the health care system.

Flak was reinforced because the

competitive pressures of America's media propels their
27 Charles E. Lindblom and Edward J. Woodhouse, The
Policy Making Process 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J . :
Prentice Hall Inc., 1993), 117.
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reliance on both sources that are presumptively accurate,
such as the HIAA, and sources that are entertaining, such as
Rush Limbaugh.

Even though much of their flak was political

misinformation, the media tended to accept it as legitimate
policy analysis.
As a member of the House Republican leadership, Dick
Armey is also an established source of information, and his
chart depicting "the Clinton Plan" as a bureaucratic
nightmare played on anti-government sentiment.

Even though

the chart illustrated much of the already existing web of
government and private insurance bureaucracy, it "soon
appeared on television, inspired cartoonists and humor
columnists, and became a staple of conservative attacks on
the Clinton

p l a n . "28

Two points can be made about the media's pack reaction
to Armey's chart.

First, most of the media accepted the

Republican's interpretation of the plan.

Why the press did

not probe what the chart truly illustrated is debatable.

On

the one hand, many members of the press probably considered
Armey to be an accurate news source.

On the other hand,

utilizing the chart was a way to save publication space, or
broadcast time.

Thus, media content gave the false

impression that the government would have complete control of
health care.

Under the President's proposal, the private

28 Skocpol, Boomerang, 143-144.
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insurance industry would continue running health care, just
as they now run Medicare.29
Second, the news vernacular explaining the chart lacked
context.

The media repeated terms such as "bureaucracy" and

"rationing," without defining them, but attaching them to the
President's proposal.

The combined effect of the media

giving credence to Armey's chart, while repeating some of the
ambiguous or negative terminology it spurned, was anti
democratic because it did not enhance the public's
understanding of the more important aspects of the health
care debate.
While some pack journalism mislead the public,
scandalous feeding frenzies surrounding the White House
tended to weaken Clinton's Presidential authority.

The

intermingling of news stories about Whitewater, Troopergate,
and Vince Foster's suicide with coverage of health care
reform portrayed an embattled Administration captured in
headlines such as "On Arkansas, Sex, Not Inhaling, and
Whitewater."
What was left out of media content was how all of these
things were connected, if they were at all.

The terminology

was generally negative but media content did not seem to
explain why.

Nonetheless, the health care issue commingled

with each scandal contributing to the triviality of the
debate.

Thus, media content tended to distract the public's

29 Representative Pat Williams, interview by author.
Tape recording, Missoula, Montana, April 25, 1997.
20 Johnson and Broder, The System, 263.
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attention away from the health care issue, and its
importance, and not empower the public with information so
that they could purposefully contribute to the debate.
Instead, trivial misinformation contributed to general
misconceptions about the President's proposal and, in the
end, to the public's rejection of the plan.
Unlike Armey's chart, or Whitewater,

Elizabeth

McCaughey's article "No Exit" was a feeding frenzy
originating within the media.

It is true, as Johnson and

Broder claim, that McCaughey is not a journalist.

However,

her false accusations were accepted as accurate, incorporated
into media content via the New Republic, and were positively
received by prominent members of the media.

Since her claims

were false their anti-democratic effect is apparent.

Media

content supporting fictional assertions is not conducive to a
healthy democracy.
The press's acceptance of McCaughey's argument also
reveals the anti-democratic effects of journalists focusing
on horse race aspects of political debate.

Evidence suggests

that the media's concentration on the mugging of "the Clinton
Plan," and not on proposed solutions to the country's health
care problems, eroded public support for any solution.

The

public turning away from comprehensive health care reform is
a significant development considering that polls since 1982
have shown that seventy percent or more of the population
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believes America's health care system needs to be either
fundamentally changed or completely rebuilt.3i
The News and Democracy Without Citizens
News coverage of the health care debate portrayed a
"democracy without citizens."

The press addressed the public

as spectators, not as citizens with the ability to make a
contribution to a democratic

d i s c u s s i o n . 32

The result was a

public lacking a clear conception of what was at stake.

Even

William Raspberry, a Washington Post columnist, noted:
[During the debate] it dawned on me that even as a
fairly attentive consumer of news, I was never
quite sure what was in any package or proposal. I
knew only who seemed at the moment to be ahead on
points, who was cheering for whom and what it all
meant for Hillary's ascendancy or demise.33
To some extent, shallow press coverage was the product
of America's free-market media.

Since the public demands

news that also entertains, media organizations are driven to
cover the more superficial aspects of the political debates.
Health care reform was also a difficult story for the press
Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Don't
Blame The Public for Failed Health Care Reform," Journal of
Health Politics, Policy and L a w , 20 n2 {Spring, 1995): 41617.
22 Robert Entman, Democracy without Citizens; The Media
and the Decay of American Politics, (New York; Oxford
University Press, 1989), as cited by W. Lance Bennett, The
Politics of Illusion 3rd ed. (New York: Longman Publishers,
1996), 31.
22 william Raspberry, "Blow-by-Blow Coverage,"
Washington Post, 30 October 1995, as cited by James Carville,
We're Right, They're Wrong; A Handbook for Spirited
Progressives (New York: Random House, 1996), 113.
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to cover.

Since time restraints restrict news programs to

sound bite-journalism, television coverage of the debate was
often fragmented.34

The print media, which "should have had

more time to prepare longer in-depth articles [often]
failed to meet the challenge; coverage was desultory,
inconsistent, or focused on the political points being scored
by opposing sides."35
However, market-pressures cannot be blamed for
journalists drawing false comparisons between "the Clinton
Plan" and a Canadian-style single-payer health care proposal.
Mar ket-pres sures cannot be the reason members of the mass
media accepted the misinformation of "Harry and Louise," or
tolerated the misleading accusations of Rush Limbaugh.

Nor

were market-pressures the only factors contributing to the
media's feeding frenzy.
It was not just capitalistic pressures that swayed the
media's coverage toward trivial conflicts and disagreements,
and away from an explanation of policy alternatives and the
pursuit of public
culture.

c o n s e n s u s . 36

it was also their journalistic

Members of the press can be blinded by their own

professional mind-set and driven by competitive pressures,
but they do not tend to be a terribly rebellious lot.

As Ted

Koppel explains, "We tremble between daydreams of scooping
all of our competitors and the nightmare of standing alone

Johnson and Broder, The System. 143.
35 Ibid,
36 Ibid., 634.
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with our scoop for too long ... many of us are truly only
comfortable when we travel in a herd. "37

The question is how

to direct the herd toward serving its citizenry, toward
enhancing the democratic process, and away from covering the
thin veneer of democratic debate.

Martin A. Lee and Norman Solcmon, Unrelia±>le Sources;
A Guide to Detecting Bias in News Media, (New York;
Carol Publishing Group, 1991), 337.
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